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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act l 
(PELRA) is now well into its second decade. Enacted in 1971,2 
PELRA is the comprehensive labor relations statute3 that governs 
l.abor relations for most state and local government employees in 
Minnesota.4 Since 1971, the statute has undergone repeated 
amendments by the legislatureS and frequent interpretations by 
1. MINN. STAT. §§ 179.61-.76 (1982),ammddby Act of June 14, 1983, ch. 364,1983 
Minn. Laws 2765. 
2. Act of July I, 1972, Ex. Sess., ch. 33, 1971 Minn. Laws 2709 (codified at MINN. 
STAT. §§ 179.61-.76). For a detailed analysis of PELRA as originally enacted, see Note, 
The Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act of 1971: Another Public Employment Experi-
ment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 134 (1972). 
3. See Note, supra note 2, at 134. PELRA covers a wide range of employees and 
employers and sets up a complete labor relations system. It is not, however, the sole stat-
ute pertaining to public sector employment. Su infta note 79 and accompanying text. 
4. Su MINN. STAT. § 179.63, subd. 7 (1982),ammded by Act of June 14, 1983, ch. 364, 
1983 Minn. Laws 2510 (definition of "employee'~; see also id. § 179.63, subd. 4 (definition 
of "employer'~. 
5. Act of June 14, 1983, ch. 364,1983 Minn. Laws 2765; Act of March 19, 1982, ch. 
495,1982 Minn. Laws 526; Act of March 19, 1982, ch. 568,1982 Minn. Laws 1236; Act of 
March 19, 1982, ch. 588, 1982 Minn. Laws 1386; Act of April 30, 1981, ch. 70, 1981 Minn. 
Laws 303; Act of April 24, 1980, ch. 617, 1980 Minn. Laws 1577; Act of May 24, 1979, ch. 
183, 1979 Minn. Laws 282; Act of May 24, 1979, ch. 332, 1979 Minn. Laws 935; Act of 
March 28, 1978, ch. 619, 1978 Minn. Laws 400; Act of March 28, 1978, ch. 776, 1978 
Minn. Laws 1095; Act of March 28, 1978, ch. 789, 1978 Minn. Laws 1155; Act of May 19, 
1977, ch. 119,1977 Minn. Laws 208; Act of May 19, 1977, ch. 206,1977 Minn. Laws 337; 
Act of May 19, 1977, ch. 284,1977 Minn. 'Laws 495; Act of March 31,1976, ch. 102, 1976 
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thejudiciary.6 Nevertheless, in many areas, the law under PELRA 
remains uncertain. Although the scope of bargaining lies at the 
core of the scheme of labor relations created by PELRA, the law 
on the scope of bargaining is especially unclear. 
The scope of bargaining is the range of issues discussed in nego-
tiations between an employer and the labor organization that rep-
resents its employees.? Under PELRA, public employees are 
grouped into bargaining units,S and the employees in each unit 
select an exclusive representative.9 The representative and the em-
ployerlO have the mutual obligation to meet and negotiate, that is, 
bargain collectively, over the employees' terms and conditions of 
employment. I I The law on the scope of bargaining defines pre-
cisely what the parties must, may, or may not bargain about. 
While the law requires only that the parties negotiate in good 
faith,12 the desired end of the negotiations is a duly ratified,13 writ-
ten 14 agreement binding both parties. It is an unfair practice l5 for 
Minn. Laws 249; Act of March 13, 1974, ch. 114, 1974 Minn. Laws 173; Act of May 24, 
1973, ch. 635,1973 Minn. Laws 1526 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 179.61-.76 (1982». 
6. Su infta notes 105-17 and 152-200 and accompanying text. 
7. Gerhart, Tlu Scope of Bargaining in Local Government Negotiations, 20 LABOR L.J. 545 
(1969). 
8. MINN. STAT. §§ 179.63, subd. 17, 179.71, subd. 3 (1982);sulii §§ 179.71, subd. 
50), 179.74, subd. 4, 179.741, 179. 742 (stat~_l!nd University of Minnesota employees); Iii 
§ 179.65, subd. 6 (certain confidential and supervisory employees, principal and assistant 
principal units). 
9. Su Iii § 179.63, subds. 5, 6; su also Iii § 179.65, subd. 6 (restrictions on the choice 
of exclusive representatives by supervisory and confidential employees). This generally is 
done through an election; Iii § 179.63, subd. 6 (defining exclusive representative as "certi-
fied"); Iii § 179.67 (election procedures). But su Iii § 179.69, subd. 1 (appears to allow 
voluntary recognition). 
10. See Iii § 179.63, subd. 4. 
11. Id. §§ 179.63, subd. 16, 179.65, subd. 4, 179.66, subd. 2, amended by Act of May 23, 
1983, ch. 364, 1983 Minn. Laws 2765; Iii § 179.66, subd. 4. For a discussion of "terms and 
conditions," see infta notes 139-200 and accompanying text. 
12. Minnesota Statutes section 179.63, subdivision 16 defines "meet and negotiate" as 
"the performance of the mutual obligations. . . to meet at reasonable times. . . with the 
good faith intent of entering into an agreement with respect to terms and conditions of 
employment; provided, that by such obligation neither party is compelled to agree to a 
proposal or required to make a concession." Id. § 179.63, subd. 16. 
13. Contracts are generally ratified by the employer via an ordinance or resolution. 
See id. § 179.70, subd. 2. State contracts are ratified by the legislature or approved tempo-
rarily by the commission of employee relations. Id. § 179.74, subd. 5; see Minnesota Educ. 
Ass'n v. State, 282 N.W.2d 915 (Minn. 1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1062 (1980); Com-
ment, Lobor Relations-Arbitration-Statute Resnving Rights of Legislature to Review and Modijj 
Arbliration Awards of State Employus Does Not Violate Equal Protection: Minnesota Education 
Association v. State, 282 N. W2d 915 (Minn. 1979), 3 HAMLINE L. REV. 195 (1980). 
14. See MINN. STAT. §§ 179.69, subd. 1, 179.70, subd. 1 (1982). 
15. See id. § 179.68, subd. I. Notwithstanding the unfair practice cause of action, 
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either party to refuse to meet and negotiate16 in good faith. 17 
PELRA provides substantial incentives, in addition to the un-
fair practice action, to serious collective bargaining. PELRA af-
fords many public employees the right to strike 18 once a deadlock 
in bargaining has occurred and certain procedural requirements 
have been met. 19 In addition, PELRA provides for binding inter-
est arbitration,2° whereby neutral third parties resolve the differ-
ences in the parties' positions and essentially write the contract for 
them. The scope of interest arbitration parallels the scope of bar-
gaining.21 The potential for strikes and interest arbitration makes 
effective collective bargaining crucial and underscores the impor-
tance of the scope of bargaining. 
The scope of bargaining has a direct impact on employer-em-
ployee relations for the life of a collective bargaining agreement. 
Under PELRA, collective bargaining agreements are administered 
through the processing and arbitration of grievances.22 The scope 
of bargaining determines in large part23 which issues are set by 
"refusal to bargain" cases have been brought in various other legal postures. E.g., Minne-
apolis Fed'n of Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Special School Dist. No. 1,258 N.W.2d 
802 (Minn. 1977) (declaratory judgment); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No. 320 
v. City of Minneapolis, 302 Minn. 410, 225 N.W.2d 254 (1975) (writ of mandamus). 
16. See supra note 12. 
17. MINN. STAT. § 179.68, subd. 2(5) (1982) (employer); id. § 179.68, subd. 3(3) (em-
ployees' and labor organizations). 
18. Id. § 179.64. Absent certain exceptions, confidential, essential, managerial, and 
supervisory employees, principals and assistant principals may not strike. Id. § 179.64, 
subd. I. For definitions of these classes of employees, see id. § 179.63, subds. 8, 9, 9(a), 10, 
II, 14. 
19. These procedural requirements include impasse, a forty-five day mediation pe-
riod, and ten days' written notice. Id. § 179.64; SI!( id. § 179.63, subd. 12. 
20. Id. § 179.72, subd. 7. For essential employees, arbitration is ordered at the request 
of either party. Id. § 179.69, subd. 3(a). For non-essential employees, arbitration is avail-
able if the parties agree to it. Id. § 179.69, subd. 3. In some cases, PELRA requires or 
allows final-offer arbitration. Id. § 179.72, subds. 7, 7(b). The parties are required to 
execute a written contract containing the terms of the award. Id. § 179.69, subd. I. Arbi-
tration awards are ratified as described at supra note 13. It is an unfair practice to fail to 
comply with an arbitration award. MINN. STAT. § 179.68, subd. 2(9) (1982) (employer); 
id. § 179.68, subd. 3(5) (employees and labor organizations). 
21. The scope of interest arbitration is confined to terms and conditions of employ-
ment and other items determined by the director. MINN. STAT. § 179.72, subd. 3; SI!( City 
of Richfield v. Local No. 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 276 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1979). 
22. See generally MINN. STAT. § 179.70 (1982) (arbitration procedure). Indeed, con-
tracts negotiated pursuant to PELRA must provide for grievance arbitration. Id. 
§ 179.70, subd. I. 
23. Grievances are statutorily defined as disputes regarding the interpretation or ap-
plication of contract terms. Id. § 179.70, subd. 6. To the extent the law on the scope of 
bargaining dictates contract terms, that law also determines what is grievable and 
arbitrable. 
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contract and, hence, which issues public employees may grieve 
and arbitrate and which issues remain in the province of the 
employer. 
The scope of bargaining also dictates the course of "meet-and-
confer." Professional employees24 and their employers are obli-
gated to confer on issues over which bargaining is not required.25 
The desired end of meet-and-confer is an exchange of views, rather 
than a binding agreement.26 
Thus, PELRA focuses attention on the scope of bargaining. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court's construction of PELRA makes 
the scope of bargaining important in other ways as well. The 
court has created the duty to provide certain information about 
subjects relevant to collective bargaining.27 The court also has 
prohibited an employer's unilateral change, that is, a change made 
without notice to and negotiations with the labor organization, in 
a subject about which the parties are obligated to bargain.28 
This Article surveys and analyzes the law on the scope of bar-
gaining under PELRA and suggests ways to make it more certain 
and responsive to public policy. Part II sets out the conflicting 
policy considerations to be accommodated in defining the scope of 
bargaining. These considerations form the basis for Part Ill's criti-
cism of the present law under PELRA and guide the recommenda-
tions for change made in Part IV. 
24. &e id. § 179.63, subd. \0 (definition of professional employee). 
25. Id. §§ 179.63, subd. 15, 179.65, subd. 3, 179.66, subds. 3, 7; see id. § 179.73. To the 
extent faculty members have no opportunity to select their representatives for meet-and-
confer purposes without joining the union, meet-and-confer requirements unconstitution-
ally infringe on the faculty members' first amendment rights. Su Knight v. Minnesota 
Community College Faculty Ass'n, III L.R.R.M. 3156 (D. Minn. 1982), affdmnn., \03 S. 
Ct. 1493, prob. juns. noted, \03 S. Ct. 1496 (1983). 
26. &e MINN. STAT. § 179.63, subd. 15 (1982). 
27. &e International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 49 v. City of Minneapolis, 
305 Minn. 364,233 N.W.2d 748 (1975). In Operating Engineers, the court held that under 
PELRA the city had the duty to disclose to the exclusive representative of its employees 
the questions and answers to a civil service promotional examination, provided the exclu-
sive representative refrained from disclosing the requested information to applicants who 
would take that examination in the future. Id. at 371, 233 N.W.2d at 753. The court held 
that the city also had a duty to disclose information regarding when and how long each 
applicant for promotion had worked for the supervisor who rated his performance. Id. 
28. See Ogilvie v. Independent School Dist. No. 341, Atwater, 329 N.W.2d 555 
(Minn. 1983); Minnesota Arrowhead Dist. Council 96 of AFSCME v. St. Louis County, 
290 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. 1980); General Drivers Union Local 346 v. Independent School 
Dist. No. 704, Proctor School 8d., 283 N.W.2d 524 (Minn. 1979); Minneapolis Fed'n of 
Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Special School Dist. No.1, 258 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 
1977); if. Minnesota Educ. Ass'n v. Independent School Dist. No. 495, Grand Meadow, 
290 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 1980) (arbitration context). 
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II. POLICIES UNDERLYING THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING 
A. Introduction 
The scope of bargaining should reflect the law's accommodation 
of the significant policy considerations underlying public sector 
bargaining. The policies underlying public sector bargaining stem 
from the interests of three main parties: employees, the govern-
ment, and citizens. Not surprisingly, the interests of each group at 
times call for different outcomes. The Minnesota Legislature has 
identified and described these interests and policies in PELRA's 
statement of purpose: 
It is the public policy of this state and the purpose of sections 
179.61 to 179.76 to promote orderly and constructive relation-
ships between all public employers and their employees, subject 
however, to the paramount right of the citizens of this state to 
keep inviolate the guarantees for their health, education, safety 
and welfare. 
The relationships between the public, the public employees, 
and their employer governing bodies imply degrees of responsi-
bility to the people served, need of cooperation and employ-
ment protection which are different from employment in the 
private sector. So also the essentiality and public desire for 
some public services tend to create imbalances in relative bar-
gaining power or the resolution with which either party to a 
disagreement presses its position, so that unique approaches to 
negotiations and resolutions of disputes between public em-
ployees and employers are necessary. 
Unresolved disputes between the public employer and its 
employees are injurious to the public as well as to the parties; 
adequate means must therefore be established for minimizing 
them and providing for their resolution. Within the foregoing 
limitations and considerations the legislature has determined 
that overall policy may best be accomplished by: 
(1) granting to public employees certain rights to organize 
and choose freely their representatives; 
(2) requiring public employers to meet and negotiate with 
public employees in an appropriate bargaining unit and pro-
viding for written agreements evidencing the result of such bar-
gaining; and 
(3) establishing special rights, responsibilities, procedures 
and limitations regarding public employment relationships 
which will provide for the protection of the rights of the public 
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employee, the public employer and the public at large. 29 
In defining the scope of bargaining, it is useful to categorize the 
major public policies to be accommodated. These policies primar-
ily point in one of two directions: toward a broad scope of bar-
gaining or toward a narrow scope of bargaining.30 Certain 
policies, however, have little to do with the breadth or narrowness 
of the scope of bargaining; rather they pertain to the integrity and 
workability of the law. This Article does not attempt to reconcile 
these policy considerations into an optimum abstract scope of bar-
gaining. Substantial empirical research would be required for 
such a task. In addition, the task of weighing and reconciling pub-
lic policies is best left to the political and judicial processes. In any 
event, choosing the label of "broad" or "narrow" does not alone 
resolve concrete bargaining questions. The more important in-
quiry is to establish which policy considerations are at work in par-
ticular cases and to make bargaining determinations accordingly. 
B. Arguments Supporting a Broad Scope of Bargaining 
The arguments for a broad scope of bargaining in the public 
sector focus on the "collective bargaining" aspect of the phrase 
"public sector collective bargaining." If collective bargaining is to 
achieve its goals of labor peace and efficient government, it must 
be "real" collective bargaining, not a pale and ineffective imita-
tion. While the law may allow or require bargaining over a sub-
ject, it does not require that the parties agree on that subject 
during their negotiations and write that agreement into a binding 
collective bargaining contract. Collective bargaining requires only 
that the parties meet and negotiate in good faith with the intent of 
reaching an agreement. 31 
The first argument for a broad scope of bargaining begins with 
the obvious point that public employees are employees, and public 
employers are employers. The considerations which led to the le-
gality and public acceptance of collective bargaining in the private 
sector-a concern for labor peace, a desire to institute democracy 
in the workplace, and the expectation that unions would bring 
29. MINN. STAT. § 179.61 (1982). 
30. In speaking of "broad" and "narrow" scopes of bargaining, it is tempting to use 
the law under the National Labor Relations Act as a measuring stick. Su gtml!ra/Iy Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. 1981). While the NLRA 
serves as a handy point ofreference, it is more productive to analyze public sector bargain-
ing on its own terms. 
31. For a definition of "meet and negotiate," see supra note 12. 
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about better political representation of the working class-apply 
to government employment as wel1.32 Public employees have as 
much at stake in their employment as do private sector workers 
and an equal right to a voice in determining the terms of their 
employment.33 Indeed, some public employees may claim an even 
broader scope of bargaining than is generally found in the private 
sector. The public sector is characterized by the unionization of 
professional employees-employees with experience, expertise, 
and interest in issues beyond labor's traditional concern over terms 
and conditions of employment.34 
Second, for collective bargaining to be effective, there must be a 
reasonably broad scope of negotiable matters. Collective bargain-
ing is a process oftrade-offs.35 The fewer the issues available to the 
bargaining parties, the less room there is for trading and the less 
productive the negotiations will be.36 Both parties could quickly 
become intractable, for example, if they were limited to negotiat-
ing only the hourly wage. 
Collective bargaining also serves as an exchange of views be-
tween an employer and its employees. The broader the scope of 
bargaining, the more the employer learns about the concerns of 
employees and the more involved and respected the employees will 
32. H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 8, 12 (1971). The 
authors note an additional reason for private sector collective bargaining-the employer's 
monopsony over labor-that they deem inapplicable to the public sector. Id. Arguably, 
at certain times, even this policy has application to the public sector. 
33. Indeed, at least one state court has held that the state's constitution requires par-
allel scopes of bargaining for the public and private sectors. &~ City of Tallahassee v. 
Public Employees Relations Comm 'n, 393 So. 2d 1147, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
34. Su generally H. DAVEY, M. BOGNANNO & D. ESTENSON, CONTEMPORARY COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING 341-45 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CONTEMPORARY BARGAINING]; 
H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 32, at 23-24. Whether professional employees 
use collective bargaining to claim a broader scope of bargaining than is generally found in 
the private sector or to further their social goals is open to debate. Compar~ Kilberg, Appro-
pnat~ Subj~cts for ColI~ctilJ~ Bargaining in Local ColJ~mment Labor R~/ations, 30 MD. L. REV. 179, 
193-94 (1970) wIth Wollett, Th~ Bargaining Itocess in th~ Public S~ctor: What is Bargainab/~? 51 
OR. L. REV. 177 (1971). There remains the equity question of whether professional em-
ployees should be granted more bargaining power than other employees simply by virtue 
of their greater experience and education. 
35. Su Wollett, supra note 34, at 178; su also Gerhart, supra note 7 (discussion of 
trade-offs made by parties engaged in public sector bargaining and how those trade-offs 
are not evident in the final contract). 
36. Su Kilberg, supra note 34, at 191; su also Rehmus, Constraints on Local ColJ~mments in 
Public Employu Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. REV. 919, 926-29 (1969) (discussion of statutory 
restraints on scope of collective bargaining). 
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feel,37 At the same time, collective bargaining informs the em-
ployer of employees' ideas concerning the administration of the 
government, some of which stem from the unique perspective of 
employees. As the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized, col-
lective bargaining can lead to improvement in the delivery of gov-
ernment services.38 
Third, a broad scope of bargaining helps to channel the efforts 
of the parties toward bargaining and away from debating, indeed 
litigating, what they may, may not, or must negotiate. The parties 
know well enough which issues concern them and are amenable to 
resolution through collective bargaining. It is distracting and 
counterproductive for the parties first to ascertain and then apply 
the legal rules. Rather, the parties themselves should decide the 
subjects of bargaining and what bargain to make.39 
C Arguments Supporting a Na"ow Scope of BargazTung 
The arguments in favor of a narrow scope of bargaining in the 
public sector focus on the "public sector" aspect of the phrase 
"public sector collective bargaining." These arguments focus on 
the fact that the employer is the government.40 They begin with 
the observation that the government operates differently than the 
37. See Edwards, The Emerging Dulj' to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 
885, 916 (1973). 
38. Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Special School Dis!. No. 
1, 258 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn. 1977). The court was concerned in this case with collec-
tive bargaining involving professional employees. The argument would seem to apply to 
other employees as well. See also Kilberg, supra note 34, at 184 (collective bargaining is a 
means of achieving labor peace and employee efficiency). 
39. Of course, the law has a proper place in proscribing and prescribing certain sub-
jects. An early article in the literature on public sector labor law, however, eloquently 
warns of laws which remove too many subjects from the scope of bargaining: 
Such laws, which encourage or require public employers [one could add, public 
employees) to avoid problems rather than deal with them, are mischievous be-
cause they produce strife and frustration rather than understanding and peaceful 
accommodation of conflicts between government and its employees. In the pub-
lic sector, as well as the private, what is bargained about, as well as what the 
terms of the bargain are, should be a function of the bargaining process, not of 
abstract concerns over sovereignty or responsiveness to misperceived legislative 
constraints. 
Wollett, supra note 34, at 182. 
40. The legal rubrics here are the doctrines prohibiting the abridgement of state sov-
ereignty and the illegal delegation of power. The former states that the state or city loses 
its inalienable sovereign power when it engages in collective bargaining. The latter states 
that the legislature may not delegate certain powers, and collective bargaining constitutes 
such a delegation. The sovereignty doctrine should not be viewed as raising an obstacle to 
public sector collective bargaining; for collective bargaining is simply the negotiation of a 
contract, a function government undertakes routinely in other settings. Once the legisla-
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private sector. Politics, not the market, runs government41-a sim-
ple observation with several aspects worth noting. 
First, the constraints on negotiations in the public sector are 
complex, elusive, and perhaps ineffective. Comparisons to the 
market forces which constrain private sector bargaining are use-
ful. 42 Private sector bargaining represents a struggle between two 
parties, the employer and employee, each with sharply divergent 
interests. Public sector bargaining involves many parties-the em-
ployer, employees, taxpayers, users of government services, interest 
groups-whose interests coincide or conflict as bargaining moves 
from issue to issue.43 Market considerations are relatively easy to 
discern, and the profit motive provides a clear standard by which 
private employers can gauge bargaining proposals. By contrast, 
the political process is often cumbersome and important view-
points may be slighted or ignored. While the market generally 
provides a quick and unequivocal reaction to the bargain struck in 
the private sector, there is no corresponding assurance of accounta-
bility in the public sector. Citizens cannot always judge the per-
formance of negotiators, and elections often occur long after the 
bargaining concludes.44 Although citizens are becoming more re-
sponsive to tax increases,45 the government's ability to raise reve-
nue and to spread the costs of operations probably makes the 
public sector more impervious to cost issues than the private sec-
tOr.46 Furthermore, many government operations are monopolies 
ture has chosen collective bargaining and fashioned appropriate parameters, the delega-
tion of authority should be deemed proper. 
41. The literature on this simple observation is extensive. Foremost is H. WELLING-
TON & R. WINTER, supra note 32. &~ also Blair, State Legislativ~ Control over th~ Conditions of 
Public Employment: Dqining th~ Scop~ of ColI~ctiv~ Bargaining for Stat~ and Municipal Employus, 
26 V AND. L. REV. 1 (1973); Corbett, Determining th~ Scop~ of Public &ctor ColI~ctiv~ Bargaining: 
A N~w Look via a Balancing Formula, 40 MONT. L. REV. 231 (1979); CONTEMPORARY BAR-
GAINING, supra note 34; Kilberg, supra note 34; Rehmus, supra note 36; Sackman, Redqining 
th~ Scop~ of Bargaining in Public Employment, 19 B.C.L. REV. 155 (1977); Summers, Public 
Employu Bargaining: A Political Perspectiv~, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974). 
42. For a detailed comparison of the private and public sectors, see H. WELLINGTON 
& R. WINTER, supra note 32, at 8-29. 
43. Su Summers, supra note 41, at 1159; H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 
32, at 22-23. 
44. Sackman, supra note 41, at 165. 
45. &~ Vaughn & Dozier, Public &ctor Bargaining Is~s in th~ 1980s: A N~utral Vz~w, 
PROCEEDINGS OF N.Y. UNIV. THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LA-
BOR 317,318 (1981). 
46. &~ H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 32, at 17-21. Contra Kilberg, supra 
note 34, at 192. 
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not pressured by cost and efficiency issues. 4 7 
Second, collective bargaining represents a radical change in 
government decisionmaking. Collective bargaining is a secret, bi-
lateral process while the political process is open and multilateral. 
The obvious concern is the stifling of the public's voice.48 At least 
where the public stands to gain or lose substantially and directly 
from the results of bargaining, or where the issues are controver-
sial, something important in the way of democracy is lost if the 
scope of bargaining is unduly broad.49 
The corollary to this concern is the fear that public employees 
exercise too much influence with access to both the standard polit-
ical process and collective bargaining to push their demands. 50 
Thus, the scope of bargaining should be narrow to assure that the 
clout of public employees does not become disproportionate to 
that of other citizens."! 
Third, the structure of government is best suited to a narrow 
scope of bargaining. Government is complex, with power diffused 
among various levels, branches, departments, and decisionmaking 
bodies. It may be difficult to determine in some instances who has 
the authority to agree to and deliver particular contract terms to 
public employees.52 Any scheme of public sector collective bar-
gaining must accommodate this system of diffused authority, in 
part by limiting the scope of bargaining to what is practicable. 
Fourth, public policy dictates that employment relations in the 
47. &<!' H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 32, at 18. 
48. &<!'J <!'.g., Corbett,supra note 41, at 255; Kilberg, supra note 34, at 192-93; Sackman, 
supra note 41, at 160. 
49. While the observation that collective bargaining differs from the political process 
is common, the implications drawn from the observation vary. &<!', <!'.g., Corbett, supra 
note 41, at 250 (institute balancing test weighing interests of employees and management's 
prerogatives or public interest); Summers, supra note 41, at 1192 (limit the scope of bar-
gaining to areas where unions encounter massed resistance in political process). For a 
lengthy discussion of the role of the public's interest in scope of bargaining decisions, see 
Sackman, supra note 41, at 168. 
50. Su CoNTEMPORARY BARGAINING, supra note 34, at 380; Summers, supra note 41, 
at 1160. But s<!'<!' Edwards,supra note 37, at 915 (political process meant to be a warring of 
various interest groups). The question remains open whether public employees shift their 
attention to collective bargaining and away from the political process once bargaining is 
made available. 
51. &<!' H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 32, at 25; S<!'<!' also Summers, supra 
note 41, at 1193 (craft scope of bargaining to reflect clout unions bear in standard political 
process). 
52. Su, <!'.g., Blair, supra note 41, at 8-9. The problem can be more or less acute. 
Compare, for example, the plight of a school board which has no independent means of 
raising revenues with a school board with taxing authority. 
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public sector be uniformly governed by a system based on merit, 
due process, and efficient government. Decades ago, these consid-
erations led to the establishment of civil service systems, designed 
to eliminate inefficiency, extravagance, and arbitrariness. 53 Even 
if the civil service system per se were to yield to collective bargain-
ing, some of its time-honored principles should survive and 
thereby constrict the scope of collective bargaining. 
The fifth argument parallels the argument for private sector 
management rights: running the operation is so difficult that the 
employer needs maximum flexibility to make decisions. The diffi-
culties of management in the public sector are due in part to the 
nature of politics and government, discussed above. In addition, 
government is now beleaguered by financial constraints, shrinking 
resources, increased demands for services, and a decline in public 
confidence. 54 
Altering the process of collective bargaining could provide a 
partial solution to the problems of accommodating collective bar-
gaining to government employment.55 Regardless of the method 
of bargaining used, however, the issue of defining its scope 
remaIns . 
.D. Securing Labor Peace and AVOIding Disruption In 
Government Services 
Public sector labor statutes were enacted in large part to deal 
with actual or threatened unrest in government employment. 56 
53. Comment, Th~ Civil Si!17Jice-ColI~ctiv~ Bargaining Conflict in th~ Public S~ctor: AII~mpls 
at Reconciliation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 826 (1971). 
54. Vaughn & Dozier, supra note 45; su also Ogilvie v. Independent School Dist. No. 
341, Atwater, 329 N.W.2d 555 (Minn. 1983) (in scope of bargaining decision, supreme 
court acknowledges needs of government for flexibility to administer its programs). 
55. PELRA sends negotiated contracts or arbitration awards to the political process 
for ratification. PELRA also provides that negotiation sessions are public unless author-
ized to be closed by the director. MINN. STAT. § 179.69, subd. 2 (1982); U~ Minnesota 
Educ. Ass'n v. Bennett, 321 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. 1982); s~~ also MINN. STAT. § 471.705 
(1982). PELRA's definition of "public employer" recognizes the structural difficulties in-
herent in government. Id. § 179.63, subd. 4. Finally, as noted above, PELRA provides for 
non-binding meet-and-confer on issues other than terms and conditions of employment. 
One could, for example, provide for traditional collective bargaining on certain sub-
jects and multi-party bargaining, including a panel of citizens, on broader policy ques-
tions. H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 32, at 150-51. Or, one could hold public 
hearings on tentative contracts or proposals. Id. at 152-53; CONTEMPORARY BARGAINING, 
supra note 34, at 396. Other possibilities include having a legislator serve on the bargain-
ing team, Blair, supra note 41, at 18, and pattern bargaining across several units, Summers, 
supra note 41, at 1198. 
56. Blair, supra note 41, at 5; H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 32, at 13. 
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Indeed, this was PELRA's genesis.57 Services and products pro-
vided by government are widely viewed as essential or sensitive, in 
part because they truly are so and in part because they are pro-
vided by government.58 Thus, strife in public sector labor rela-
tions, which may lead to disruption in government services, is 
widely viewed as something to avoid if possible. 59 
It is unclear how this concern for labor peace affects the scope of 
bargaining. Uncertainty about the scope of bargaining no doubt 
leads to frustration and probably to work stoppages in attempts to 
force the issues.60 The uncertainty problem aside, opinions about 
the role of labor peace diverge. On the one hand, the more issues 
there are to bargain over, the more issues there are to strike over.61 
On the other hand, an expansive scope of bargaining may provide 
the opportunity for trade-offs and hence the striking of a bargain 
which could avert a work stoppage.62 
The role played by the availability of the right to strike is 
equally unclear. The Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated 
that employees deprived of the right to strike deserve a broad 
scope of bargaining, apparently to compensate for the lack of this 
bargaining weapon.63 The logic of this quid pro quo is debatable. 
The right to negotiate over a wide range of issues does not really 
compensate employees for the inability to make bargaining de-
mands felt by striking legally.64 In any event, strikes occur 
whether they are legal or illegal,65 and the more important ques-
57. PELRA grew out of a bitter teacher's strike in Minneapolis in 1970. Note, supra 
note 2, at 136; s~~ also City of Richfield v. Local No. 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 276 
NW.2d 42 (Minn. 1979). 
58. H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 32, at 18-19. 
59. But s~~ Sackman, supra note 41, at 163 (noting that public employees and the 
public are becoming more willing to "take" strikes). 
60. Corbett, supra note 41, at 241. 
61. E.g., Kilberg, supra note 34, at 188. 
62. E.g., Blair, supra note 41, at 6. 
63. &~, ~.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No. 320 v. City of Minneapolis, 
302 Minn. 410, 415, 225 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1975); accord City of Richfield, 276 N.W.2d 42, 
47 (Minn. 1979); Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers v. Minneapolis Special School Dist. No. 
1, 258 NW.2d 802, 805 (Minn. 1977). 
64. One could also argue that other mandatory impasse resolution methods have the 
same effect as the strike. Edwards, supra note 37, at 922. Furthermore, there is reason to 
doubt that a change in the law on strikes would bring about a change in the law on scope 
of bargaining. Clark, TIz~ Scop~ 0/ tlz~ Duty to Bargain in Public Employment, LABOR RELA-
TIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 81, 98 (1981). 
65. An example of an illegal strike is the Minneapolis teachers' strike of 1970. See 
Note,supra note 2, at 134. The sanctions available for violations of strike bans may make 
some difference. PELRA makes a strike in violation of PELRA an unfair practice, MINN. 
HeinOnline -- 10 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 226 1984
226 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW (Vol. 10 
tion is what scope will least incline employees to strike. 
On balance, the better argument is that a relatively expansive 
scope of bargaining which encompasses subjects amenable to reso-
lution through collective bargaining is most likely to lead to labor 
peace. This position assumes that frustration over not having a 
voice in employment decisions leads workers to strike, which in-
deed seems to be the case.66 
E A Workable Legal Framework 
It is one thing to formulate law which properly accommodates 
conflicting interests and policy considerations. It is quite another 
to craft law which works well for those it governs. Too often, our 
legal system creates abstract rules and regulations which prove 
confusing and counterproductive in application.67 
At least three goals must be met in drafting workable law on the 
scope of public sector bargaining. First, rules or standards must be 
sufficiently straightforward to lead to readily discernible results. 
Accordingly, tests which are not self-defining should be defined or 
replaced.68 The system oflegal analysis should be as simple as pos-
sible.69 Second, the law must afford a reasonable degree of flex-
ibility. Public sector labor law is still a relatively new 
phenomenon7o with many unanswered questions. In addition, 
public sector labor laws cover a wide range of employers and em-
STAT. §§ 179.64, subd. 1 (b), 179.68, subd. 3(11) (1982), and grounds for termination, Id. 
§ 179.64, subd. 2. 
This Article does not resolve the major policy question of whether public sector strikes 
should be legal. The arguments in favor of the right to strike include the equity argument 
that public employees should be able to strike if private employees can and the concern 
that the strike is necessary for effective bargaining. A chief argument against legal public 
sector strikes is that they afford public employees undue clout given the essentiality of 
government services. Some would say this clout is incompatible with the public trust held 
by public employees. 
66. For example, the air traffic controllers' strike against the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration in August of 1981 stemmed from the union's inability to negotiate matters of 
central concern to the controllers. See Murdock & Arnold, The Congressional Mandate 
Against a Federal Strike: the Covernmmt-s Enforcemmt of That Statutory GUIdance, 47 J. AIR L. & 
COM. 303, 308:09 (1982); Notis, In Defense of PATCO, 47 J. AIR L. & COM. 317, 332 
(1982). 
67. See Bok, A Flawed System, 85 HARV. MAG. 38 (1983). 
68. See Edwards, supra note 37, at 914. 
69. See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, supra note 32, at 146 (pattern oflaws affecting 
scope of bargaining is "bizarre')' 
70. The first step toward public sector bargaining occurred in New Hampshire in 
1955. Blair, supra note 41, at 2. At the time of this writing, PELRA is only a dozen years 
old. 
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ployees whose interests and situations vary. Finally, no matter 
how well the law is drafted, disputes over the bargainability of 
particular subjects in particular cases will arise. Thus, the law 
must provide for a quick, efficient, and reasonably available 
method of resolving bargaining disputes.7 1 This method should 
create a body of precedent to guide parties in the future as well. 
The importance of establishing a workable legal framework 
must not be underestimated. In this sensitive area, where reason-
able minds clearly differ and the law's preferred method of resolv-
ing disputes easily comes to a standstill, the law's guidance should 
be clear. 
III. THE SCOPE OF BARGAINING UNDER PELRA 
A. IntroductIon 
Defining the scope of bargaining in Minnesota is needlessly diffi-
cult. The law is intricate and ambiguous; it employs inconsistent 
doctrines and standards that defy definition. To compound the 
problem, the system for resolving bargaining disputes under 
PELRA is inefficient in producing solutions in particular cases and 
inadequate in facilitating the development of the law. Further-
more, the law does not always lead to sound results. In many ar-
eas, results are based on the application of technical legal rules 
rather than on the important policy considerations set forth in 
Part II. 
This section is organized to parallel the analytical steps one 
must take to determine whether a proposed subject is bargainable. 
The bargainability of the subject depends first on whether PELRA 
limits or prohibits bargaining on the matter at issue. The next 
step entails a study of other state statutes and local ordinances and 
resolutions which touch on public employment and may operate 
to restrict the scope of bargaining. If PELRA or other state and 
local regulations do not proscribe bargaining on the subject, the 
inquiry extends to whether the subject is a "term or condition of 
employment" or an "inherent managerial policy." Bargaining is 
mandatory if the subject is determined to be a "term or condition 
of employment." Bargaining is permitted but not required if the 
subject is labeled an "inherent managerial policy." Unfortu-
nately, the results of this analysis are not always clearcut. Thus, 
parties often resort to litigation to resolve bargaining disputes. 
71. See Edwards, supra note 37, at 927. 
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B Statutory Limitations on the Scope of Bargaimng 
Many contract terms in Minnesota public sector labor relations 
are not negotiated by the parties. Various laws, including 
PELRA, dictate certain contract terms and remove certain sub-
jects from the scope of bargaining by vesting sole authority over 
those subjects in the government. This aspect of the law on the 
scope of bargaining under PELRA is the most problematic, al-
though there are a few bright spots. 
I. Terms Set by PELRA 
PELRA itself prescribes several contract terms. Contracts nego-
tiated under PELRA are generally limited to terms of no more 
than three years. 72 All contracts must contain grievance proce-
dures and provide for compulsory binding arbitration of griev-
ances. 73 PELRA mandates union dues check-off for the exclusive 
representative,74 and requires employers to afford reasonable time 
off to officers of exclusive representatives so they can fulfill their 
collective bargaining duties. 75 
These provisions stand in welcome contrast to the generally 
troublesome character of this area. Although setting terms by stat-
ute necessarily constricts the options available to negotiators, the 
terms required by PELRA are justifiable. These terms preserve 
collective bargaining and do not unduly infringe on those aspects 
72. Teacher contracts must have two-year terms and must begin on July 1st of odd-
numbered years. There may be no wage reopeners. MINN. STAT. § 179.70, subd. 1 
(1982);su City of Richfield v. Local No. 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 276 N.W.2d 42 
(Minn. 1978) (arbitration award of survivorship clause limited to three years); Skeim v. 
Independent School Dis!. No. 115,305 Minn. 464, 234 N.W.2d 806 (1975) (two-year rule 
does not apply to individual teachers' contracts issued under MINN. STAT. § 125.12 
(1982)); Op. Att'y Gen. 172-c Oune 30, 1980) (§ 179.70, subd. 1 of the Minnesota Statutes 
prohibits mid-year renegotiation of compensation). 
73. MINN. STAT. § 179.70, subd. 1 (1982). In the event the contract fails to contain 
these procedures, the grievance and arbitration procedure promulgated by the Director of 
Mediation Services is imposed. Id. 
74. Id. § 179.65, subd. 5; see Anoka-Hennepin Educ. Ass'n v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. 
School Dis!. No. 11,305 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. 1981). PELRA provides for a fair shan, fee 
for the exclusive representative. MINN. STAT. § 179.65, subd. 2 (1982); see Threlkeld v. 
Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers, Local 872, 316 N.W.2d 551 (Minn. 1982), appeal dismissed, 
103 S. C!. 24 (1982) (fair share fee provisions satisfy due process requirements); see also 
Robbinsdale Educ. Ass'n v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers, Local 872,307 Minn. 96, 239 
N.W.2d 437 (1976), vacated, 424 U.S. 880 (1975) (similar litigation over previous system); 
Note, Union Support by Nonunion Bargaining Unit Members in Minnesota Public Employment, 10 
Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 267 (1984). 
75. Officers also must be granted leaves of absence upon request. MINN. STAT. 
§ 179.66, subd. 10 (1982). 
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of the employer-employee relationship best left to the parties' ne-
gotiations. 76 Furthermore, these provisions provide fairly clear 
rules for negotiators. 77 
2. The Role of Other Laws 
a. Introduction 
PELRA was not written on a clean slate. When PELRA was 
enacted in 1971, the Minnesota Statutes contained many laws gov-
erning public employment,78 and similar local ordinances and res-
olutions existed as well. Many of these state and local laws 
survived PELRA and remain in effect today.79 The interaction of 
PELRA and these state and local laws has produced conflicts and 
confusion. 
General Drzvers, Local 316 lJ. Aztkzn County Board80 provides a 
glimpse into the types of laws which coexist with PELRA and the 
confusion that can result. Aztkzn County involved the termination of 
three deputy sheriffs in three different counties and required the 
supreme court to evaluate the job security of each deputy. Two of 
the three sheriffs relied on a century-old statute which allows sher-
iffs to hire and fire deputies at will.8) The third sheriff relied on 
compliance with the civil service system for deputy sheriffs which 
76. Although the substance of these provisions is for the most part unobjectionable, 
the provision setting contract terms provides a source of debate. The arguments for the 
statutory contract requirements include: safeguarding against unduly long contracts 
which become obsolete; providing for contract stability, in the case of the prohibition on 
reopeners; facilitating the coordination of negotiations with budget cycles; and confining 
potential labor unrest to times when the public can tolerate it. The chief argument to the 
contrary is that these provisions may call for disruptive renegotiation of a satisfactory 
contract. Furthermore, the reopener prohibition locks both parties into terms and hence 
contracts that may prove restrictive. SIt/! City of Richfold, 276 N.W.2d at 48; Op. Att'y Gen. 
172-c Oune 30, 1980). 
77. These provisions, however, are scattered throughout PELRA. None is found in 
the basic sections on the scope of bargaining. The four terms listed are found in three 
different parts of PELRA. Once they are located, these provisions are generally easy to 
understand. The major exception is the provision requiring grievance and arbitration 
procedures. Section 179.70, subdivision 1 requires the "arbitration of grievances including 
all disciplinary actions." MINN. STAT. § 179.70, subd. 1 (1982). This language provides 
that arbitration of grievances is not limited to disciplinary actions but gives no indication 
as to other subjects which must be arbitrated. 
78. Public sector collective bargaining did exist prior to PELRA, but not in a com-
prehensive form. Su Note, supra note 2, at 134-35. 
79. One informal survey of the 1982 Minnesota Statutes by the author yielded a 
count of seventy statutes directly touching on various public employees' terms of 
employment. 
80. 320 N.W.2d 695 (Minn. 1982). 
81. MINN. STAT. § 387.14 (1982). 
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his county had adopted pursuant to state law.82 One of the depu-
ties was a veteran who claimed Veterans Preference rights under 
yet another Minnesota statute.83 Finally, the three deputies relied 
on collective bargaining agreements negotiated pursuant to 
PELRA.84 
As this case demonstrates, other laws can have a considerable 
impact on the scope of bargaining. If other laws prevailed over 
PELRA, the scope of bargaining would constrict markedly. For 
example, a deputy's job security in effect would not be bargainable 
if the sheriffs statute prevailed over any agreement covering the 
deputy. The job security provisions of a contract would have to 
allow for Veterans Preference rights if that statute prevailed over 
PELRA. 
Civil service systems may have an especially great impact on the 
scope of bargaining. Such systems typically encompass many sub-
jects covered by collective bargaining.85 The statute creating the 
civil service system in Allicin County) for example, includes the fol-
lowing matters: classification of employees, promotion procedures, 
suspensions,86 grounds for removal from employment, procedures 
for contesting removals,87 and "[s]uch otl;ler rules" as may be 
needed to accomplish the purposes of the system.88 
The present system for accommodating collective bargaining 
and other statutes can best be understood by referring first to per-
tinent PELRA provisions, then to judicial decisions which grapple 
with those provisions, and finally to other statutes which have 
been revised to accommodate PELRA. 
b. PELRA PrOlJlSlons 
Several PELRA provisions89 touch on the relationship between 
82. Su id. §§ 387.31-.45. 
83. Su 1f1. § 197.46. 
84. The result: The sheriffs statute is superseded by any of the other three-the civil 
service system, the Veterans Preference statute, and the collective bargaining agreements. 
The civil service system and the agreement coexist, giving the employee his choice be-
tween the two. The veteran could claim the protections of both the collective bargaining 
. agreement and the Veterans Preference statute, although only the agreement's procedures 
need be followed if the agreement incorporates Veterans Preference rights. Aitkin COUl/ty, 
320 N.W.2d at 699-702. For a more detailed discussion of the court's reasoning, see infta 
notes 112-14 and accompanying text. 
85. Su Comment, supra note 53, at 826; Rehmus, supra note 36, at 927. 
86. MINN. STAT. § 387.36 (1982). 
87. Id. § 387.41. 
88. Id. § 387.36. 
89. One PELRA provision which accommodates collective bargaining and other stat-
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PELRA contract terms and state and local statutory and regula-
tory law. The chief provision, section 179.66, subdivision 5 of the 
Minnesota Statutes,90 provides: 
Any provision of any contract required by section 179.70, 
which of itself or in its implementation would be in violation of 
or in conflict with any statute of the state of Minnesota or rule 
or regulation promulgated thereunder or provision of a munici-
pal home rule charter or ordinance or resolution adopted pur-
suant thereto, or rule of any state board or agency governing 
licensure or registration of an employee, provided such rule, 
regulation, home rule charter, ordinance, or resolution is not in 
conflict with sections 179.61 to 179.66, shall be returned to the 
arbitrator for an amendment to make the provision consis-
tent with the statute, rule, regulation, charter, ordinance or 
utes is section 179.63, subdivision 4, which contains the definition of "employer." Id. 
§ 179.63, subd. 4. This section was at issue in Aillcin County. As then written, the definition 
made the county board, which served as the PELRA employer, the "governing body" 
with final budgetary authority. The section also provided that the sheriff, as the ap-
pointing authority, retained whatever power was consistent with the collective bargaining 
agreement. The court found that the collective bargaining agreements were valid; they 
had been negotiated by the county boards, although not by the sheriffs. Ailkin County, 320 
N.W.2d at 705 (the opinion of Judge Thomas J. Stahler of the Eighth Judicial District was 
incorporated by the court). Under section 179.63, subdivision 4, PELRA and hence the 
collective bargaining agreements prevailed over the sheriffs statute. Id. at 700. 
The Ailkin County problem is not peculiar to the employment relationship between 
deputy sheriffs and their employers. In Arrowhead Regional Corrections Board v. Graff, 
321 N.W.2d 53 (Minn. 1982), the court followed Alikin County in a case involving the 
termination of a probation officer by a judge. At issue was Minnesota Statutes section 
260.311, subdivision I. Id. Similar conflicts probably exist between other statutes and 
collective bargaining agreements. Su, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 384.08 (1982) (deputy county 
auditors); id. § 385.02 (deputy county treasurers); id. § 388.10 (assistant county attorneys); 
I'd. § 487.10 (deputy county clerks of court); see also I'd. § 179.66, subd. 1 (restrictions 
against contracts which limit the right to hire supervisory employees or state managers); 
I'd. § 179.66, subd. 6 (legislature retains right to establish compensation for its employees). 
The legislature amended the definition of "public employer" in 1982. Act of March 
22, 1982, ch. 588, § 1, 1980 Minn. Laws 1341-42. This amendment occurred while the 
Minnesota Supreme Court was considering Alikin County. The statute now indicates that 
the governing body of a government unit is the PELRA employer, notwithstanding laws 
such as the sheriffs statute, and that the views of "appointing authorities" must be consid-
ered by the PELRA employer. Unfortunately, there are some inconsistencies. The "ap-
pointing authority" referred to in section 179.63, subdivision 4 is defined as the person 
who has standing to institute interest arbitration. MINN. STAT. § 179.63, subd. 4 (1982). 
County boards acting as employers have standing to institute interest arbitration under 
PELRA. Id. § 179.69, subds. 3, 3a. In addition, it is unclear what happens if the views of 
the appointing authority are not sought. 
90. For a brief time, this provision was ungrammatical and hence nonsensical. See 
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No. 320 v. City of Minneapolis, 302 Minn. 410, 
225 N.W.2d 254 (1975). 
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resolution.91 
A parallel provision provides that decisions of arbitration panels 
which violate state statutes and local regulations or ordinances 
shall have no force or effect.92 
Early in PELRA's history, the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
strued section 179.66, subdivision 5 to be a general prohibition on 
contract terms which conflict with the public employers' home 
rule charter.93 The court also determined that the section operates 
to limit the scope of bargaining.94 More recently, the court af-
firmed that although the employer must honor its contractual obli-
gations to the fullest extent possible, PELRA and collective 
bargaining agreements do not supersede the sources of law listed in 
the section.95 For example, an employer which has agreed to nego-
tiate over terms covered by a civil service system can do so, but 
cannot agree to terms which violate the civil service system.96 
Section 179.66, subdivision 5, a crucial section of PELRA, is 
poorly drafted. The statutory language does not say what it in-
tends or at least what the courts have construed it to say-that 
other laws override PELRA. Furthermore, the statutory language 
proves vague in application. For example, while a contract provi-
sion calling for a school year of 175 days would clearly "conflict 
with" a statute requiring 180-day school years, it is unclear 
whether the same provision would conflict with a statute giving 
school boards the responsibility of setting school calendars. 
The difficulty with section 179.66, subdivision 5 goes beyond 
poor draftsmanship. The provision creates a blanket override, re-
gardless of the law involved. It places substantial restrictions on 
bargaining based on the mere existence of other laws. Such re-
strictions complicate bargaining by diverting the parties' attention 
from bargaining to legal proscriptions and hamper their ability to 
91. MINN. STAT. § 179.66, subd. 5 (1982). 
92. Id. § 179.72, subd. 7. In two respects the provisions are not parallel: 1) section 
179.66, subdivision 5 lists rules governing licensure of employees, while section 179.72, 
subdivision 7 does not, and 2) section 179.72, subdivision 7 speaks of incurring penalties 
under the listed laws, while section 179.66, subdivision 5 speaks only of violations of the 
listed terms. Su also'-d. § 179.70, subd. 5 (arbitration decisions subject to section 179.72, 
subd. 7). Section 179.72, subdivision 7 also applies to grievance arbitration decisions. Id. 
§ 179.72, subd. 7. 
93. T~amst"s, 302 Minn. at 417-18, 225 N.W.2d at 258-59. 
94. Id. at 418, 225 N.W.2d at 259. 
95. Su Minnesota Arrowhead Dist. Council 96 of AFSCME v. SI. Louis County, 290 
N.w.2d 608, 612 (Minn. 1980). 
96. Id. 
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make trade-offs and exchange views. These restrictions serve no 
useful purpose unless they are justified by policy concerns, such as 
assuring political resolutions of fundamentally political problems 
or reserving authority to an appropriate governmental entity. 
Clearly, not all laws deserve to override collective bargaining. For 
example, providing veterans with preferential employment rights 
may comport with Minnesota's public policy, regardless of what 
employers and employees may wish. But it is incongruous to pro-
vide for collective bargaining for deputies while retaining the pow-
erful unilateral control sheriffs have over the employment of 
deputies under the sheriffs statute. 
The blanket override function afforded local legislation under 
section 179.66, subdivision 5 is particularly questionable. The 
state legislature can properly institute checks on the system of col-
lective bargaining it created; it is another matter for local bodies to 
institute such checks or to opt out of the collective bargaining sys-
tem altogether. PELRA clearly grants full collective bargaining 
rights to local employees97 at their option, rather than at the op-
tion of their employers.98 
The counterargument-that failing to allow local legislative 
preemption of collective barg~ining impermissibly affronts local 
autonomy-is easily rebutted. Most matters deemed to be of over-
riding importance to local governments are likely to be covered by 
state statutes, which more properly supersede collective bargain-
ing, or qualify as permissive subjects.99 Other matters should yield 
to the superior state policy favoring collective bargaining. In any 
event, local employers remain free to resist making concessions. 100 
This flaw in section 179.66, subdivision 5 is ameliorated by the 
1983 amendment to section 179.66, subdivision 2, which sets out 
the general requirement that employers meet and negotiate: 
The public employer's duty under this subdivision exists 
notwithstanding contrary provisions in a municipal charter, or-
dinance, or resolution. A provision of a municipal charter, or-
dinance, or resolution which limits or restricts a public 
97. Local employees are covered by PELRA, as are state employees. MINN. STAT. 
§ 179.63, subds. 4, 7 (1982). 
98. A collective bargaining relationship comes into being when employees so choose. 
&~ Id. § 179.67. 
99. For a discussion of permissible subjects, see supra notes 162-66 and accompanying 
text. 
100. PELRA does not require that a party make concessions to meet the test of bar-
gaining in good faith. MINN. STAT. § 179.63, subd. 16 (1982). 
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employer from negotiating or from entering into binding con-
tracts with exclusive representatives is superseded by this 
subdivision. 101 
This amendment appears to repeal the statutory and regulatory 
override of subdivision 5 insofar as local legislation is concerned. 
While this amendment moves in the right direction, it lacks clar-
ity. The amendment can be read to forbid only local ordinances 
which opt out of collective bargaining altogether, or it can be 
construed to forbid ordinances which set employment terms which 
should be bargained. Furthermore, subdivision 5 as construed 
and the amendment to subdivision 2 conflict regarding local 
legislation. 
In one respect, PELRA calls for the coexistence of collective bar-
gaining and other laws. Section 179.70, subdivision 1 provides 
that employees covered by civil service and collective bargaining 
agreements have their choice between civil service appeals and 
grievance arbitration of adverse disciplinary decisions. 102 This sec-
tion is noteworthy because it seeks to accommodate collective bar-
gaining and the system existing prior to PELRA.103 It represents a 
more refined approach to this general problem than do the blanket 
rules under subdivisions 2 and 5 of section 179.66. Furthermore, 
section 179.70, subdivision 1 is well-drafted. Unfortunately, its re-
lationship to section 179.66, subdivisions 5 and now 2 is not ex-
pressed in the statute. 
As a review of the above statutory sections indicates, the sections 
of PELRA which seek to define its relationship with other laws are 
scattered throughout the statute. None are readily detectable as 
provisions affecting the scope of bargaining. 104 The awkward 
placement of these provisions aggravates the difficulty encoun-
tered in interpreting them. 
101. Act of May 23, 1983, ch. 364, 1983 Minn. Laws 2767. 
102. Once the employee has made his or her choice, that election is binding. The 
provision does not require employers or unions to bargain on matters other than terms 
and conditions of employment. MINN. STAT. § 179.70, subd. 1 (1982). 
103. At least, this is the accommodation made between state civil service and collective 
bargaining. Cf. id. §§ 43A.OI-.47 (state civil service act). One could argue that, under the 
amended section 179.66, subdivision 2, civil service systems created by local law are con-
trary to collective bargaining agreements and defer to those agreements. On the other 
hand, one could argue that the appeals aspect of local civil service systems is not contrary 
under section 179.66, subdivision 2, in light of section 179.70, subdivision 1 's express ac-
commodation, and thus that the two coexist. 
104. For example, the provision on civil service systems is tucked away in a section on 
grievance arbitration. See id. § 179.70, subd. I. 
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c. Case Law 
Given the confusing interaction between PELRA and other 
state and local laws, it is not surprising that the case law under this 
aspect of PELRA is confusing as well. A brief survey of the cases 
decided before the amendment to section 179.66, subdivision 2 un-
derscores the criticisms of the statute set forth above. In one line of 
cases, the court has found collective bargaining not to conflict with 
other laws. In a second line of cases, limits are placed on the scope 
of bargaining by other laws. 
In several cases, collective bargaining has prevailed for various 
reasons notwithstanding other laws. In Intematzonal Brotherhood of 
Teamsters} Local No. 320 v. Ciry of Minneapolis} \05 the parties were 
allowed to negotiate over written reprimands in the absence of a 
controlling city charter provision. 106 In Intematzonal Umon of Operat-
ing Engineers, Local No. 19 v. Ciry of Mznneapolzs} \07 the court found 
that rules promulgated by the Minneapolis Civil Service Commis-
sion under its authority granted by the Minneapolis charter did 
not limit the city's duty to provide information, since the rules are 
not a source of law listed as superseding collective bargaining. \08 
In Skeim v. Independent School DzstrzCt No. 11.5, \09 the court found that 
a state statute granted the school board the authority to conduct 
school on Columbus Day.1 \0 In dictum, the court indicated that 
teaching on legal holidays could be bargainable. II I In Aitkzn 
Counry, the court again refused to allow the existence of other laws 
to limit the scope of bargaining under PELRAl12 The supreme 
court held that the deputy claiming rights under the Veterans' 
Preference Act was entitled to both the protections of that statute 
and his rights under the collective bargaining agreement. 1 13 The 
court also allowed a deputy to choose between the protection of 
\05. 302 Minn. 4\0, 225 N'w.2d 254 (1975). 
\06. Id. at 418, 225 N.W.2d at 259. 
\07. 305 Minn. 364, 233 N'w.2d 748 (1975). 
\08. Id. at 371-72, 233 N.W.2d at 754. The rules pertained to the Commission's duty 
to release data about competitive exams. 
\09. 305 Minn. 464, 234 N.W.2d 806 (1975). 
110. Id. at 470-71, 234 N.W.2d at 811; set' MINN. STAT. § 126.13 (1982). 
Ill. 305 Minn. at 464, 234 N.W.2d at 811. The court ruled that the teachers' individ-
ual contracts, which had provided for school on Columbus Day, were enforceable even 
though the teachers had selected an exclusive bargaining representative; there was no col-
lective bargaining agreement. Id. 
112. 320 N'w.2d 695 (Minn. 1982). 
113. Id. at 701. Since the collective bargaining agreement had incorporated his Veter-
ans' Preference rights, the court held that proceeding under the grievance procedure in the 
collective bargaining agreement would suffice. Id. 
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the civil service system or the collective bargaining agreement. I 14 
Thus, in some cases the court has followed the technical rules of 
PELRA to find in favor of collective bargaining, while in other 
cases, the court's decision in favor of collective bargaining is not 
readily explainable. 
The second line of cases demonstrates a contrary approach. In 
these cases, the court has allowed the existence of other laws to 
restrict the scope of bargaining under PELRA. In Teamsters, for 
example, a Minneapolis city charter provision allowing thirty-day 
suspensions without a hearing operated to bar negotiations on sus-
pensions. 115 In Minnesota Arrowhead Dzstnet Counczl 96 oJ AFSCME v. 
St. LoUIs County, 116 the St. Louis County civil service system, which 
classified employees and set wage scales, was held to restrict the 
scope of bargaining. I 17 Both cases represent a relatively straight-
forward application of section 179.66, subdivision 5. 
As these cases demonstrate, the case law in this area is confusing 
for two reasons. The law's present approach, while capable of 
yielding answers, is based not on a sound judgment of what collec-
tive bargaining should encompass, but rather on the application of 
technical legal rules and the fortuity of other existing laws. IIB 
Why parties should be allowed to negotiate over written repri-
mands, but not over thirty-day suspensions, is inexplicable. It is 
illogical to include competitive exams within the scope of bargain-
ing while excluding wage scales. 
In addition, the opinions in these cases do not further the ra-
tional development of the law. In Skezm, for example, there is vir-
tually no analysis of why the Columbus Day statute allows 
bargaining over school holidays. Nor is there any significant anal-
ysis of the Veterans Preference question in Aztkin County. The 
supreme court has not yet elucidated what constitutes a "conflict" 
or "violation" under section 179.66, subdivision 5. One suspects 
that the weaknesses in the case law testify to the foibles of 
PELRA's provisions in this area. 
114. Id. at 702. 
115. 302 Minn. at 418, 225 N.W.2d at 259. 
116. 290 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. 1980). 
11 7. Id. at 611. 
118. One could argue that the existence of a law which prevails over PELRA attests to 
the decision of lawmakers that the law ought to set the terms governed by the statute. 
This may be true in some cases, but many laws which conflict with PELRA pre-date 
PELRA. In any event, it is unclear from the face of many of the laws at issue that the 
precedence of these laws is based on the policy considerations discussed in Part I. &~ supra 
notes 30-66 and accompanying text. 
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d Accommodations Made in Other Statutes 
The problem of integrating collective bargaining and other laws 
has been approached, to a limited degree, from the other direction. 
Other statutes have been amended to accommodate PELRA.119 
This approach is another bright spot in this area of the law. 
One example is provided by Minnesota's general teacher tenure 
statute. 120 The hiring and tenuring of a teacher are governed 
solely by statute. 121 The statute contains exclusive substantive and 
procedural provisions for almost all of the grounds on which a 
teacher's employment may be terminated. 122 The statute, how-
ever, allows collective bargaining agreements to govern unre-
quested leaves of absence due to cutbacks in staff;123 absent an 
agreement, the statute provides the rules. 124 This accommodation 
of collective bargaining is not, however, made for first-class city 
teachers.125 Thus, the statutory system of teacher tenure accom-
modates collective bargaining only to a limited extent. 126 
A much more extensive integration of collective bargaining and 
other statutes is found in chapter 43A of the Minnesota Stat-
utes,127 the state civil" service statute. Chapter 43A creates a com-
plete civil service system which governs certain terms of 
employment for all state civil servants. Other terms set out in the 
statute yield to collective bargaining agreements where they exist 
and apply where there is no agreement. The accommodation is 
indicated by statements throughout the chapter that collective 
119. Two rules of construction govern the accommodation of PELRA and other stat-
utes: (1) the specific provision controls the general or (2) the non-PELRA statutes no 
longer conflict with PELRA under section 179.66, subdivision 5. Su MINN. STAT. 
§ 179.66, suM 5 (1982). 
120. Id. § 125.12. Section 125.12 governs most teachers, although teachers in first class 
city school districts are excluded. Id. § 125.12, subd. 13. Section 125.17 covers teachers in 
first class city school districts. Id. § 125.17; see Skeim v. Independent Dist. No. 115,305 
Minn. 464, 234 N.W.2d 806 (1975) (individual contracts under section 125.12 co-exist 
with collective bargaining agreements). 
121. MINN. STAT. § 125.12, subds. 2-4 (1982). 
122. Such grounds include retirement, inefficiency or neglect of duties, gross miscon-
duct, or the illness of the teacher. See id. § 125.12, subds. 5-8. 
123. Id. § 125.12, subd. 6a. 
124. Id. § 125.12, subd. 6b. 
125. This matter is covered exclusively by statute. See id. § 125.17, subd. 11. 
126. Su id. § 125.12, subd. 2 (individual contracts required except where "master 
agreement" exists); id. § 125.12, subd. 4 (timing of termination letters tied into negotia-
tions); id. § 125.12, subd. 14 (collective bargaining grievance procedure used to contest 
personnel files). Section 125.17, subdivision 12 parallels section 125.12, subdivision 14-
the only accommodation made in section 125.17 to collective bargaining. 
127. Id. §§ 43A.01-.47. 
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bargaining agreements supersede the statutory terms.128 For ex-
ample, collective bargaining agreements may cover the classifica-
tion of positions and the establishment of salary ranges;129 
compensation, subject to state policies calling for nondiscrimina-
tion, parity, and merit pay;130 and procedures for challenging dis-
cipline and discharges, although the definition of just cause is set 
by statute. 131 Yet, in areas such as affirmative action,132 political 
activities,133 and retirement,134 collective bargaining is given no 
role. In some respects, collective bargaining and the previous sys-
tem have been combined. \35 Although one can criticize the lines 
drawn in some areas,136 chapter 43A constitutes a more-refined 
and, hence, better accommodation of collective bargaining and 
civil service than is generally found in Minnesota. 137 
The approach taken by the teacher tenure statute and chapter 
43A are preferable to PELRA's blanket override. Amending other 
statutes to accommodate collective bargaining allows for, indeed 
requires, careful thought about what collective bargaining should 
encompass. The policies underlying collective bargaining can best 
be considered in a clear and specific statutory framework. 
e. Summary 
Fitting collective bargaining into a pre-existing system of civil 
service and other laws touching on public employment was not 
destined to be an easy task. Unfortunately, the efforts of the past 
twelve years have not produced a viable solution. The PELRA 
provisions on this crucial matter are poorly drafted and inconsis-
128. Se~ iel. § 43A.01(2). This subsection provides that collective bargaining agree-
ments supersede certain listed sections only to the extent expressly permitted in those sec-
tions. This provision is puzzling, because it is unclear whether PELRA contracts may 
supersede sections not listed. 
129. lei. § 43A.07 (2). 
130. lei. §§ 43A.18, 43A.01(2), (3), 43A.20. 
131. lei. § 43A.33(2), (3). . 
132. lei. § 43A.19. 
133. lei. § 43A.32. 
134. lei. § 43A.34. 
135. Se~, ~.g., iel. § 43A.05(5) (monies to ameliorate inequities in pay among male-dom-
inated and female-dominated jobs are allocated by legislature to bargaining units and 
disbursed within units according to collective bargaining agreements). 
136. Se~ iel. § 43A.l6 (sets parameters on probationary periods). It is unclear why this 
should not be entirely subject to negotiation. 
137. As T~amsln-s, Opn-aling Engin~n-s, and Arrowhead Council 96 demonstrate, other civil 
service systems have not undergone this reform. S~e also iel. §§ 44.01-.16 (basic municipal 
civil service system). After the amendments to section 179.66, subdivision 2, the status of 
these systems is an open question. 
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tent. The law's general thrust-the blanket override of collective 
bargaining-is ill-advised, since it tends to ignore or gloss over the 
policy considerations underlying collective bargaining. 
There are, however, some signs of improvement: the amend-
ment to section 179.66, subdivision 2, which acknowledges that lo-
cal law should not prevail over collective bargaining, and the 
accommodation of collective bargaining found in chapter 43A. 
These recent changes represent a more refined approach to the 
problem of defining PELRA's relationship to other laws. Part IV 
of this Article recommends that the law build on these first steps 
toward a more rational system. 
C Terms and Conditions oJ Employment Versus Inherent Managerzal 
Polides 
If no law prohibits bargaining on a subject, the subject is 
bargainable. The question then arises whether the subject is 
mandatory or permissive. If the subject is mandatory, a party 
must bargain over it if the other party so requests. If the subject is 
permissive, a party may bargain over it at the request of the other 
party, but is not required to do so. Under PELRA, "terms and 
conditions of employment" comprise the category of mandatory 
subjects and "inherent managerial policies" comprise the category 
of permissive subjects. For the most part, the legislature has left 
the difficult task of drawing the line between the two categories to 
the courts. 
I. The Statutory Categones and Their Signijicance 
PELRA obligates employers and exclusive representatives to 
meet and negotiate l38 over "terms and conditions of employ-
ment."139 Section 1 79.63, subdivision 18 defines "terms and condi-
tions of employment" as: 
[T]he hours of employment, the compensation therefor includ-
ing fringe benefits except retirement contributions or benefits, 
and the employer's personnel policies affecting the working 
conditions of the employees. In the case of professional employ-
ees the term does not mean educational policies of a school dis-
trict. The terms in both cases are subject to the provisions of 
138 .. "Meet and negotiate" entails meeting at reasonable times with the good faith 
intent of entering into an agreement. Id. § 179.63, subd. 16. 
139. Id. § 179.65, subd. 4 (employees' obligation); id. § 179.66, subds. 2,4 (employer's 
obligation). Both parties are also obligated to negotiate regarding grievance procedures. 
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section 179.66 regarding the rights of public employers and the 
scope of negotiations. 140 
Section 179.66, subdivision 1 provides: 
A public employer is not required to meet and negotiate on 
matters of inherent managerial policy, which include, but are 
not limited to, such areas of discretion or policy as the functions 
and programs of the employer, its overall budget, utilizaton of 
technology, the organizational structure and selection and di-
rection and number of personnel .... 141 
PELRA makes clear that bargaining over terms and conditions 
is mandatory, while bargaining over managerial policies is permis-
sive. The parties have the "obligation" to negotiate over terms 
and conditions,142 while the employer "is not required" to negoti-
ate over managerial policies. 143 Although the Minnesota Supreme 
Court at first seemed to view matters of managerial policy as non-
negotiable,144 the court now holds that bargaining may occur over 
such matters if the employer so chooses.1 45 Thus, there are two 
classes of bargaining subjects under PELRA, mandatory terms 
and conditions and permissive managerial policies. 146 
The statutory language has several flaws. As a technical matter, 
the sentence in section 179.63, subdivision 18 excluding "educa-
tional policies of a school district" from the terms and conditions 
of professional employees l47 is incongruous; some professional em-
140. Id. § 179.63, subd. 18. 
141. Id. § 179.66, subd. I. The section also provides that public employers may not 
limit their rights to select supervisory employees or state managers. See ,ii. 
142. Id. §§ 179.65, subd. 4, 179.66, subds. 2, 4. 
143. Id. § 179.66, subd. I. It should be noted that the employer chooses whether to 
negotiate over managerial policies. There is no comparable category controlled by the 
exclusive representative. Furthermore, contracts may contain terms and conditions of em-
ployment and "such other matters as may be agreed upon." Id. § 179.70, subd. I. 
144. Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers v. Minneapolis Special School Dist. No.1, 258 
N.W.2d 802, 804, 806 (Minn. 1977). 
145. Minnesota Arrowhead Dist. 96 v. St. Louis County, 290 N.W.2d 608, 611 (Minn. 
1980); see auo St. Paul Fire Fighters, Local 21 v. City of St. Paul, 336 N.W.2d 301, 302-03 
(Minn. 1983); Arrowhead Public Servo Union v. City of Duluth, 336 N.W.2d 68, 71-72 
(Minn. 1983). 
146. PELRA also requires professional employees and their employers to meet and 
confer over matters not considered terms and conditions of employment. Set! MINN. STAT. 
§§ 179.65, subd. 3, 179.66, subd. 3 (1982); St!t! also ,ii. § 179.73. Thus, for professional em-
ployees the categorization of a subject determines whether bargaining must occur over the 
subject-not whether it is foreclosed from mandatory discussion altogether. However, 
meet-and-confer has relatively little substance to it. For example, it is not an unfair prac-
tice to refuse to meet and confer, although it is unfair to refuse to meet and negotiate. Id. 
§ 179.68. Thus, the more important question is the scope of meet-and-negotiate. 
147. Id. § 179.63, subd. 18. 
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ployees do not work for school districts, and no similar express ex-
clusion is made for them. 148 Moreover, while an attempt has been 
made to define the two terms by providing examples, the examples 
are no more self-defining than are "terms and conditions" or "in-
herent managerial policies." Finally, sections 179.63 and 179.66 
define two categories which should be mutually exclusive in such a 
way that there is significant overlap. An item which has to do 
with the "selection ... of personnel," for example, is almost cer-
tain to "affect the working conditions of employees." 149 
Furthermore, the wisdom of the basic stance taken by 
PELRA-that there be mandatory and permissive subjects-is 
subject to debate. Collective bargaining becomes more compli-
cated because the parties must take into account a fine legal line. 
Perhaps the parties should be obligated to discuss all items not 
precluded by other laws and decide between themselves the terms 
of the contract. 150 If the distinction is to be retained, it should be 
as clear as possible, while still providing flexibility to cover many 
different situations. The resolution of this debate thus depends on 
how well the line is drawn. 
2. Drawing the Line Between the Categones 
a. Introduction 
Since PELRA's enactment, the line drawn between terms and 
conditions and inherent managerial policies, or between 
mandatory and permissive subjects,151 has been a fertile ground for 
148. Whether retirement benefits should be excluded from terms and conditions is a 
policy question open to debate. The exclusion reflects the fact that government employee 
pension and retirement programs are governed by statute. Id chs. 352, 352A, 352B, 352C, 
352D, 353. While the exclusion no doubt provides standardization and centralization, 
and may produce cost savings and a method of controlling corruption, it also removes 
from bargaining a major aspect of the employment relationship. 
This provision has yielded an unusual scope of bargaining case. In AFSCME Councils 
6, 11, 65 and 96, AFL-CIO lJ. Sundquist, the supreme court concluded that the language 
excepting retirement contributions from terms and conditions renders retirement matters 
illegal subjects of bargaining. 338 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Minn. 1983). The case arose when 
the legislature changed the contributions of public employees into public pensions as a 
result of a state fiscal crisis. 
149. Section 179.63, subdivision 18 ends with a reference to section 179.66. This refer-
ence could be interpreted as indicating that in doubtful situations, the subject at issue is 
not a term or condition of employment. Thus far, this reference has not been viewed as a 
method of resolving the overlap problem. 
150. See Edwards, supra note 37, at 916; Kilberg, supra note 34, at 182. 
151. Several Minnesota Supreme Court decisions raise the question whether there 
truly is a line between the two statutory categories. Although early in PELRA's history 
the court recognized a dividing line, the current view seems to be that there is an area 
HeinOnline -- 10 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 242 1984
242 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. \0 
litigation. A catalogue of litigated issues exposes the trouble spots. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held the following to be terms 
and conditions of employment or mandatory bargaining sub-
jects: 152 disciplinary matters,153 the fairness of exams used for pro-
motions,154 the criteria used to transfer teachers within a school 
district,155 a survivorship clause,156 subcontracting and the effects 
of the employer's subcontracting of union work,157 the impact of a 
decision to divest certain positions of administrative functions,158 
the criteria and procedures used to transfer a teacher to another 
school district,159 the adoption of criteria for selection of employees 
for a training program,l60 and the pay and work hours for train-
ees. 161 On the other hand, the court has held the following not to 
be terms and conditions of employment and hence permissible 
bargaining subjects: the decision to use competitive exams for pro-
motions,162 the decision to transfer teachers within a school dis-
trict,163 the procedure used to divest administrative functions from 
certain positions,l64 lay-offs due to financial problems or lack of 
where the two overlap. The latter view derives from the court's parsing a subject into a 
decision, its implementation, and its effect on employees. See infta notes 185·200 and ac-
companying text; see also St. Paul Fire Fighters, 336 N.W.2d at 305-07. Whatever the an-
swer to this fine semantic question, there clearly is a line between permissive and 
mandatory subjects. 
152. Some earlier cases used the terminology of the statute, while later cases used the 
terms "mandatory" or "permissive." Earlier cases are also unclear regarding the negotia-
bility of managerial policies. 
153. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No. 320 v. City of Minneapolis, 302 Minn. 
410,225 N.w.2d 254 (1975). 
154. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 49 v. City of Minneapolis, 
305 Minn. 364,233 N.W.2d 748 (1975). 
155. Minneapolis Fed'n, 258 N.W.2d at 804. 
156. City of Ric!!field, 276 N.W.2d at 42. 
157. General Drivers Union, Local 346 v. Independent School Dist. No. 704, Proctor 
School Bd., 283 N.W.2d 524 (Minn. 1979). The parties agreed that the subcontracting 
itself was a mandatory subject. Id. at 527. 
158. Minneapolis Ass'n of Adm'rs & Consultants v. Minneapolis Special School Dist. 
No.1, 311 N.W.2d 474 (Minn. 1981). 
159. Ogilvie v. Independent School Dist. No. 341, Atwater, 329 N.W.2d 555 (Minn. 
1983); see also Minnesota Fed'n of Teachers, Local 331 v. Independent School Dist. No. 
361,310 N.W.2d 482, 485 (Minn. 1981) (Simonett, J., concurring) (impacts of change in 
teacher workload are term and condition of employment). 
160. St. Paul Fire Fighters, 336 N.W.2d at 301. 
161. Id. 
162. Operating Engineers, 305 Minn. at 364,233 N.W.2d at 748. 
163. Minneapolis Fed'n, 258 N.W.2d at 802. 
164. Minneapolis Adm'rs, 311 N.W.2d at 474; see also M,nnesota Fed'n Local 331, 310 
N.W.2d at 482 (teaching load is not term or condition of employment). 
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work,165 and the decision to have a training program and its 
content. 166 
As the catalogue demonstrates, most of the issues litigated con-
cern work assignment or job security. While these subjects are im-
portant to the parties and thus likely to produce litigation, it is 
troublesome that litigation occurs frequently over a relatively nar-
row range of subjects. This pattern suggests that the law under 
PELRA has not stabilized into principles or analyses which lead to 
predictable results. 
In some cases, the court has relied on the statutory language, 
unembellished by analogies or presumptions. 167 In many in-
stances, however, the statutory language is susceptible to various 
interpretations. Hence, the court has developed aids to construc-
tion of the two provisions. 
b. The Presumption in Favor of a Libera! Scope of Bargaining 
Early in PELRA's history, the court determined that PELRA 
requires a broad scope of mandatory bargaining: 
A major purpose of PELRA is to further the resolution of labor 
disputes through negotiation. Because of the severe restrictions 
on strikes contained in the act, we believe that the legislature 
intended the scope of the mandatory bargaining area to be 
broadly construed so that the purpose of resolving labor dis-
putes through negotiation could best be served. 168 
The quid pro quo drawn by the court between strike rights and 
the scope of bargaining is not entirely convincing. A broad scope 
of bargaining does not necessarily compensate for a weak bargain-
ing position. In addition, since 1975, when the quid pro quo was 
suggested, the right to strike under PELRA has expanded signifi-
cantly.169 Furthermore, strike rights for different types of employ-
165. City ofDululh, 336 N.W.2d at 71-72. 
166. SI. Paul Fir~ Fighlm, 336 N.W.2d at 302-03. 
167. E.g., Minn~apolis Adm'rs, 311 N.W.2d at 476 (decision to divest administrative 
functions goes to "organizational structure and the selection and direction and number of 
personnel"); City of Richfold, 276 N.W.2d at 49 (survivorship clause affects the welfare of 
the employees); MinNapolis F~d'n, 258 N.W.2d at 805 (decision to transfer teachers goes to 
direction of personnel, but criteria affect employees' welfare); T~amsl"s, 302 Minn. at 416, 
225 N.W.2d at 257 (disciplinary matters affect the employees' working conditions). 
168. Teamsl"s, 302 Minn. at 414, 225 N.W.2d at 257 (citation omitted); accord City of 
Richfold, 276 N.W.2d at 49; Minn~apolis &d'n, 258 N.W.2d at 805. 
169. Originally, PELRA provided for the termination of any employee who partici-
pated in a strike. A 1973 amendment provided for a legal strike when the employer re-
fused to arbitrate or comply with an arbitral award. &~ T~amsl"s, 302 Minn. at 415, 225 
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ees vary dramatically. Confidential, essential, managerial, and 
supervisory employees, for example, may not strike. 170 The ques-
tion then arises whether the scope of mandatory bargaining should 
constrict accordingly. 171 
In Minneapolis Federation of Teachers) Local 59 lJ. Minneapolis Special 
School District No. I) 172 a case involving the negotiability of trans-
ferring teachers, the court advanced another rationale for a broad 
scope of bargaining, stating: 
If all districts must negotiate, input from the teachers' organi-
zations is assured. Both administrators and school boards, on 
the one hand, and teachers, on the other, must be deemed to 
have the interests of the students and the school district at 
heart. Both are competent to recommend changes in policy. 
We believe the legislature intended that the public would bene-
fit from the contributions of both groups by the passage of this 
act and that the transfers of individual teachers were intended 
to be a negotiable item. 173 
Although this rationale for the presumption in favor of a broad 
scope of bargaining has more intrinsic logic than the strike rights 
argument, it also appears to lead to different scopes of mandatory 
bargaining for different employees. Arguably, professional em-
ployees, such as teachers, should secure a broader scope of 
mandatory bargaining than other employees. This distinction at 
least bears a logical relationship to one of the purposes of collective 
bargaining: to address the interests of employees. 
A liberal presumption toward the scope of bargaining is not nec-
essarily ill-advised. For example, if one's chief concern were labor 
peace, a liberal attitude toward the scope of bargaining would be 
appropriate, all else being equal. 174 The crucial phrase is "all else 
being equal." A major difficulty with a presumption toward a 
N.W.2d at 257 n.2. Compare the present section 179.64, enacted in 1980, Act of April 25, 
1980, ch. 617, § 22, 1980 Minn. Laws 3930. 
170. See MINN. STAT. § 179.64 (1982). 
171. As to the 1980 amendments, the answer may depend on the definition of "re-
stricted." Although strike rights for public employees now are greater than before, they 
still do not compare to those of private employees under the NLRA. See R. GoRMAN, 
BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw: UNIONIZATION AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING 209-373 
(1976). The Minnesota Supreme Court appears not to have reiterated the rationale dis-
cussed here since the 1980 amendments liberalizing the right to strike. Nevertheless, it has 
continued to cite cases relying on the rationale. See, e.g., Ogilvie, 329 N.W.2d at 558 (citing 
Minneapolis Fed'n, 258 N.W.2d at 802). 
172. 258 N.W.2d at 802. 
173. Id. at 805. 
174. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text. 
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broad, or for that matter narrow, scope of bargaining is that it 
tends to ignore the diverse policy considerations underlying collec-
tive bargaining. Thus, more than a mere presumption is needed to 
produce sound, principled results. 
In any event, the presumption favoring a broad scope of bar-
gaining under PELRA has not sufficiently sharpened the line be-
tween mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects. Thus, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has developed other approaches to the 
problem. 
c. Analogies to the NLRA 
Early in PELRA's history, the Minnesota Supreme Court indi-
cated a willingness to consider case law developed under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in construing PELRA 
provisions. The NLRA, like PELRA, requires employers and un-
ions to negotiate over "terms and conditions of employment."175 
As the court has stated: 
While we find these [NLRA] decisions instructive, they are not 
controlling because the NLRA contains no definition of the 
phrase 'terms and conditions of employment,' while the 
PELRA does contain such a definition. In any event, it is clear 
from decisions such as Fibreboard Corp. v. N.L.R.B. [citation 
omitted] that the United States Supreme Court has given 
broad definition to the phrase 'terms and conditions of em-
ployment' in interpreting the National Labor Relations ACt. 176 
Shortly thereafter, the court stated more forcefully that NLRA de-
cisions are not binding on the court. 177 The court focused on the 
different contexts governed by PELRA and the NLRA and on the 
legislature's statement of policy 178 providing that different rules 
should be drafted for the public sector under PELRA. 179 
While there is some justification for referring to private sector 
precedent, such a reference is not a satisfactory answer to the prob-
lem of defining the scope of bargaining under PELRA. A chief 
argument for looking to NLRA precedent is the similarity in lan-
175. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). 
176. T~amstm, 302 Minn. at 415, 225 N.W.2d at 257;cf MilllleapolisFed'lI, 258 N.W.2d 
at 805. 
177. Opn-atillg Ellgillms, 305 Minn. at 364, 233 N.W.2d at 748. 
178. MINN. STAT. § 179.61 (1982). 
179. 305 Minn. at 369, 233 N.W.2d at 752. 
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guage in PELRA and the NLRA.180 The terminology of the two 
statutes, however, is not identical. The NLRA neither defines 
"terms and conditions of employment" nor provides an equivalent 
to PELRA's inherent managerial policies. 
A second argument in favor of borrowing NLRA precedent l81 is 
that it provides a handy reference. However, the contexts of the 
two statutes differ. For example, in creating a management rights 
limitation on the scope of bargaining under the NLRA, the United 
States Supreme Court has focused on the need of management to 
run the business. 182 While this concern also applies in the public 
sector,183 this is neither the only nor the major limitation to be 
placed on public sector bargaining. Many of the policies underly-
ing public sector collective bargaining do not apply to the private 
sector. 
On balance, the Minnesota Supreme Court's use of NLRA pre-
cedent may have been justifiable in PELRA's earlier years. Now 
that PELRA has its own jurisprudence and parties have had expe-
rience with public sector bargaining, reliance on NLRA precedent 
is unnecessary.184 
d. Decisions} ImplementatIon} and Efficts 
Over the past eight years, the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
developed a different approach to scope of bargaining questions. 
This approach focuses on whether the item at issue is a decision 
(permissive), the implementation of a decision (mandatory or per-
missive), or the effect of a decision (mandatory). The inquiry then 
extends to whether the decision and its implementation are inex-
tricably intertwined; this determination governs whether the im-
plementation is mandatory or permissive. This approach, which 
now prevails, is misdirected and confusing to apply. Its subtleties 
180. Compau 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (d), 159(a) (1976) with MINN. STAT. § 179.63, 
subd. 18 (1982) ("terms and conditions of employment'} 
181. For a discussion of the NLRA law on the scope of bargaining, see R. GoRMAN, 
supra note 171, at 496-531. 
182. Se~ First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677-80 (1981); 
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210-12 (1964). 
183. Harper, ulJ~/ing th~ Road ftom Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance: Th~ 
Scop~ of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1500-03 (1982). 
184. Another good reason for dispensing with NLRA precedent is that the law under 
the NLRA changes, making it a dubious reference point. Compar~ Fibreboard Paper 
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203,210-12 (1964) with First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. 
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). 
HeinOnline -- 10 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 247 1984
19841 SCOPE OF BARGAINING 247 
of analysis and genesis can be understood only by revIewmg its 
evolution. 
The court first recognized the distinction between decisions, pro-
cedure and criteria, or implementation, and effects in a case where 
the distinction was readily apparent. In the 1975 case Operating 
Engineers) the court found the decision to administer competitive 
examinations for promotion an inherent managerial policy, while 
the fairness of the examination fell within terms and conditions of 
employment. 18!> Two years later, in MinneapolIs Federation) the 
court determined that the decision to transfer teachers was a man-
agerial policy, while the criteria for determining which teachers to 
transfer qualified as a term or condition of employment. 186 Thus, 
the general rule developed that employers need not bargain over 
decisions regarding, for example, selection and direction of person-
nel, but must bargain over criteria, procedures, and the effects of 
their decisions. 
The law took a confusing turn in 1979. In General Drivers Union 
Local 316 v. Independent School DlstnCt No. 701, Proctor School Board, 187 
the court indicated, in dictum, that both subcontracting of union 
work and the effects of the subcontracting were mandatory bar-
gaining subjects. 188 Perhaps the court's decision on the bar-
gainability of subcontracting (a decision) can be discounted as 
dictum prompted by the parties' agreement on the issue. 189 It is 
more difficult to reconcile the general rule and MinneapolIs Assocz"a-
tion of AdmInIstrators and Consultants v. Mznneapolts SpecIal School Dls-
tnCt No. I. 190 There, the court found the procedure by which 
certain positions were to be divested of administrative functions a 
matter of managerial policy.191 
The court's most recent decisions attempt to reconcile Mznneapo-
Its Federation and Mznneapolls AdmInIstrators. In OgIlvie v. Independent 
School DlstnCt No. 311) Atwater) 192 the court determined that the 
adoption of criteria by which to transfer a teacher to another 
school district part-time was a proper subject for negotiation. 193 
185. 305 Minn. at 373, 233 N.W.2d at 754. 
186. 258 N.W.2d at 805. 
187. 283 N.W.2d 524 (Minn. 1979). 
188. 283 N.W.2d at 527. 
189. Id 
190. 311 N.W.2d 474 (Minn. 1981). 
191. Id at 479. 
192. 329 N.W.2d at 558. 
193. Although the court found the question of which teacher was to be assigned part-
time at another school district moot since only one teacher was employed at the time the 
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The court in essence chose to follow Minneapolis Federation, rather 
than Mt,meapolzs Administrators. The opinion offers two explana-
tions for the difference between Mtnneapolzs Admznzstrators and the 
two teacher transfer cases. First, the decision and implementation 
were inextricably intertwined in Mznneapolzs Admznzstrators, unlike 
the teacher transfer cases. 194 Second, the court alluded to the dif-
ference in size between the school districts involved, without quite 
explaining which way the difference cutS. 195 
In St. Paul Fire Fighters, Local 21 v. Gz'ry of St. Paul, 196 the court 
held that the decision to set up a training program for all fire cap-
tains and the content of the program were not mandatory subjects, 
although aspects of the program's implementation, for example, 
the captains' pay during the program, did constitute mandatory 
subjects. 197 The court also indicated in dictum that, had the pro-
gram been designed to allow only certain captains the opportunity 
to participate, the adoption of criteria for selecting participants 
would be a mandatory bargaining subject. 19B While the court's 
reasoning is oblique and inconsistent with previous cases,199 it is 
clear that the court continues to follow the distinction between de-
case reached the supreme court, it addressed the issue to determine the correctness of the 
trial court's decision. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. "There are, of course, significant differences in what is likely to hamper the direc-
tion of educational objectives in a school district which employs about 3500 teachers and 
what is likely to impede the direction of educational objectives in a school district like 
Atwater, which employs about 45 teachers." Id. 
196. 336 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1983). 
197. Id. at 303. 
198. Id. at 302-03. 
199. The Fire Fighters court stated: 
As we have previously observed, areas of "inherent managerial policy" and 
"terms and conditions of employment" oftentimes overlap. Minnesota A"owhead 
DistnCt Counctl 96 of American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employus v. St. 
Louis County, 290 N.W.2d 608, 611 (Minn. 1980). A decision in respect of a mat-
ter of inherent managerial policy-a discretionary decision which a public em-
ployer is not required to negotiate-may well impinge upon negotiable terms 
and conditions of employment. MINN. STAT. § 179.66 (1982). The impact upon. 
the terms and conditions of employment of an inherent managerial policy deci-
sion does not, however, render the policy decision a subject of mandatory negoti-
ation if the decision and its implementation are so inextricably interwoven that 
requiring the public employer to meet and negotiate the method of carrying out 
its decision would require the employer to negotiate the basic policy decision. 
Su Minneapolis Association of Administrators and Consultants v. Minneapolis Special 
School Distnet No. /, 311 N.W.2d 474, 476-77 (Minn. 1981). If, however, the 
inherent managerial policy decision is severable from its implementation, the 
effect of implementation on the terms and conditions of employment is negotia-
ble to the extent that negotiation is not likely to hamper the employer's direction 
of its functions and objectives. Minneapolis Federation of Teachers, Local 59 v. Minne-
apolis Special School DistnCt No. /,258 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn. 1977); Intemational 
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cisions, implementation, and effects. Furthermore, the opinion fo-
cuses on the first explanation set forth in Ogilvie for classifying 
certain procedures and criteria as mandatory and others as permis-
sive. Procedures and criteria are mandatory if they are inextric-
ably intertwined with decisions. 2°O 
Dividing a subject into a decision, the criteria and procedure by 
which it is implemented, and the decision's effects on employees is 
problematic. Few subjects can be so tidily divided. The fact that 
case law does not clearly define the categories makes the artificial 
lines between them unclear and difficult to apply. The aspect of 
the test requiring an analysis of whether a decision is inextricably 
interwoven with its implementation compounds the difficulty. In 
short, the approach is unworkable and unpredictable. 
Equally important, this approach does not lead naturally to 
proper results. For example, the basic categorization rule would 
have required that the procedure in Minneapolis Administrators be 
labeled a mandatory subject. Nevertheless, negotiating the 
method by which administrative functions were to be divested 
from administrative positions understandably struck the court as 
close to the heart of management; thus, the rule was circumvented. 
Union ofOpuating EnginUTs lJ. City of Minn~apolis, 305 Minn. 364, 233 N.W.2d 748 
(1975). 
The trial court enjoined the City from assigning veteran fire captains to the 
OTP on the ground that the manner of determining which fire captains should 
participate in the program was not a decision fundamental to the existence, di-
rection and operation of the fire department. Since it cannot be seriously dis-
puted that participation in the program affects the terms and conditions of 
employment as defined by Minn. Stat. § 179.63, subd. 18, had the decision been 
to designate some, but not all, fire captains for participation in the OTP, the 
adoption of selection criteria would have been an appropriate subject for negoti-
ation. &~ Minn~apolis Fduation of Tt:achus, Local 59 lJ. Minn~apolis Sp~cial School 
District No. 1,258 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn. 1977). The City's actual decision-to 
establish an Officers Training Program in which all fire captains, veterans as 
well as those newly appointed, must participate-is a policy decision directly 
related to the management of a traditional governmental function. To require 
the City to negotiate either the form and content of the program or criteria for 
exempting some fire captains would be to require negotiation of the basic policy 
decision, which we hold is a nonnegotiable matter of inherent managerial policy. 
We conclude, however, that certain aspects of the implementation of the 
Officers Training Program which directly affect the terms and conditions of the 
fire captains' employment are severable from the inherent managerial policy de-
cision and are appropriate subjects for negotiation. 
Id. The opinion is inconsistent with previous holdings insofar as it suggests that (1) a 
decision could be a mandatory subject if it is not intertwined with its implementation; 
(2) effects of a decision are negotiable, in fact, "mandatory," only if the decision and its 
implementation are severable; (3) a decision which involves all employees is less 
mandatory than a decision which involves only some; and (4) it is important whether the 
activity is "a traditional governmental function." 
200. Id. 
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The approach also proved unsatisfactory in St. Paul Fire Fighters. It 
is difficult to see why the creation of a training program for all fire 
captains was deemed permissive while the selection of participants 
in a program for selected captains would be a mandatory bargain-
ing subject. 
The difficulty is that the decisions/implementation/effects ap-
proach is misdirected. It focuses on inappropriate abstractions, 
such as the degree to which a decision and its implementation are 
intertwined. It does not focus on the policy considerations under-
lying collective bargaining which should govern scope of bargain-
ing determinations. A better approach to the Minneapolis 
Administrators case, for example, would be to analyze such consid-
erations as the employer's need to maintain a modicum of control 
over its operations and the benefits to be gained from bargaining 
with employees over the reorganization. While the deci-
sions/implementation/effects approach can be manipulated to 
achieve proper results, the law should base those results on a 
straightforward analysis of the truly important facts and policies. 
e. Summary 
The line between mandatory and permissive subjects is poorly 
drawn at present. The present statutory language is vague. The 
judiciary has adopted several approaches which neither mesh well 
nor lead to predictable results. The court's use of the strike rights 
theory while simultaneously borrowing from NLRA precedent is 
particularly puzzling. In finding NLRA precedent instructive, the 
court has noted that the scope of bargaining under the NLRA-
where employees may strike freely-is broad. Yet the court has 
justified a broad scope of bargaining under PELRA in order to 
compensate for the restricted strike rights of public employees. An 
inconsistency also exists between the presumption favoring a broad 
scope of bargaining and the decisions/implementation/effects ap-
proach. The latter is a technical test which is not aided by a pre-
sumption, whichever way the presumption cuts. These 
inconsistencies highlight the law's present lack of focus and 
guidance. 
D. Dispute Resolution 
The uncertainty of the law on the scope of bargaining under 
PELRA increases the likelihood of intractable disputes. The im-
pact of disputes in this area is great, since disputes interrupt ongo-
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ing collective bargaining relationships. Thus, there must be an 
effective, quick, and reasonably available method of resolving dis-
putes. In addition, a system which can quickly develop a signifi-
cant body of reliable precedent to guide negotiators is needed in 
this largely unsettled area. The present system for resolving bar-
gaining disputes under PELRA achieves neither of these goals. 
The method for resolving bargaining disputes under PELRA is 
the initiation of an unfair practice case against the employer201 or 
against the exclusive representative of the employees.202 Unfair 
practice charges are brought in the district court in whose jurisdic-
tion the unfair practice occurred, and remedies consist of injunc-
tive relief and money damages. 203 
The use of an unfair practice charge has many shortcomings. 
An action in district court involves the trappings of civil litigation: 
pleadings, discovery, motion practice, trials with formal rules of 
evidence, and appeals. 204 These trappings and the accompanying 
delay are ill-suited to the prompt resolution of disputes. Bargain-
ing may cease and unilateral changes become faits accomplis while 
the dispute works its laborious way through the courts. 
Furthermore, the present system is not designed to yield a large 
body of precedent. District court decisions are not compiled in a 
readily usable form and are of little precedential value. They may 
also be inconsistent, since they emanate from judges throughout 
the state. While supreme court decisions are compiled and do pro-
vide binding precedent, they are relatively few and far between 
and involve a narrow range of bargaining subjects. The current 
system of dispute resolution must therefore be reexamined and 
modified to increase efficiency and provide reliable precedent. 
201. MINN. STAT. § 179.68, subd. 2(5) (1982). 
202. lei. § 179.68, subd. 3(3). Scope of bargaining issues also appear occasionally in 
arbitration cases. For example, an arbitrator may be asked to decide whether an employer 
has waived an inherent managerial policy. s.,." City of Duluth, 336 N.W.2d at 68. The 
bargaining issue thus becomes merged with a contract question. Thus far, the chief forum 
for bargaining disputes has been the unfair practice case. 
203. MINN. STAT. § 179.68, subd. 1 (1982). 
204. Although the legislation creating the intermediate court of appeals does not ex-
pressly address the appeal of unfair labor practice rulings, these rulings presumably would 
be appealed first to the intermediate court and then to the supreme court. S"" Act of June 
1, 1983, ch. 247, 1983 Minn. Laws 934. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 
A. Introduction 
The present law on the scope of bargaining in Minnesota is 
neither workable nor designed to produce sensible results overall. 
The following recommendations are offered to make the law un-
derstandable to those who must follow or apply it and to create 
law which more closely reflects Minnesota's policy in this area. 
The recommendations do not attempt to delineate which subjects 
are bargainable and which are not; rather, they suggest a better 
legal framework for making determinations. 
The recommendations rest on an assumption that Minnesota 
law prefers a liberal scope of bargaining. PELRA states that Min-
nesota generally favors vital collective bargaining, limited only by 
the public's guarantees to health, safety, education, and welfare.205 
Furthermore, Minnesota has a generally liberal approach to pub-
lic sector labor law. For example, many Minnesota public em-
ployees may strike legally,206 even though this right is relatively 
rare in the public sector.207 The Minnesota Supreme Court has 
consistently upheld public sector arbitration over claims that it im-
properly displaces the employer's role.208 While the court's reasons 
for favoring a broad scope of bargaining may be debatable, the 
court's basic reading of Minnesota's public policy is taken to be 
accurate. 
While the following recommendations assume a predisposition 
toward a broad scope of bargaining, the assumption does not sup-
plant the need to consider the full range of policies underlying the 
scope of collective bargaining. Rather, the following recommen-
dations call for consideration of the policies in light of Minnesota's 
general attitude toward this area. 
The needed changes must come from both the legislature and 
the courts. Indeed, the changes entail action by a new administra-
tive agency as well. The proposal may be summarized as follows: 
(1) The legislature should reevaluate Minnesota's statutes 
touching on public employment. First, state statutes wholly in-
205. MINN. STAT. § 179.61 (1982). 
206. Id. § 179.64. 
207. Few states permit public employee strikes. &i!, i!.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 
(1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-32-110 (1981); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 243.726 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1001-1010 (Purdon 1964). 
208. &i!, i!.g., McGrath v. State, 312 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. 1981); Ramsey County v. 
AFSCME, Council 91, 309 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1981). 
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compatible with collective bargaining should be repealed. The re-
maining statutes should be amended to state their relationships to 
collective bargaining. Second, PELRA should indicate that col-
lective bargaining preempts local legislation which is contrary to 
collective bargaining. Third, civil service should play only a mini-
mal role where collective bargaining exists. 
(2) There should be two statutory categories of bargainable mat-
ters: mandatory and permissive. PELRA should be amended to 
set out these two mutually exclusive categories, each defined by 
balancing the employees' interests in the subject against the em-
ployer's interests and by a non-exhaustive list of subjects. The 
supreme court should continue its presumption favoring a liberal 
scope of bargaining and shift to a case-by-case balancing test. 
(3) The legislature should create an administrative agency simi-
lar to the National Labor Relations Board to resolve scope of bar-
gaining questions in the first instance and to create a substantial 
body of reliable precedent under the new law. 
B. Terms Set by Other Laws 
There is room in Minnesota public sector labor relations for em-
ployment terms set by state or local law rather than by collective 
bargaining. Unfortunately, the present law on this point is un-
clear. While certain small changes would lead to some iniprove-
ment, only major amendments to PELRA and other laws bearing 
on public employment will accomplish the necessary changes.209 
1. Reevaluate Minnesota -:r Public Employment Statutes 
Some of the arguments favoring a narrow scope of bargaining in 
the public sector have substantial merit and call for the exclusion 
of certain subjects from the category of allowable bargaining sub-
jects. Some decisions, for example, should be made at levels of 
government or by bodies which are not PELRA employers.210 
There are issues of great import and controversy that call for reso-
lution via the multilateral political process rather than through 
bilateral collective bargaining.211 Terms of employment should be 
209. For a general discussion of how this problem has been handled elsewhere, see 
Edwards, supra note 37, at 895-99; Sackman, supra note 41, at 168-78. 
210. See, e.g., AFSCME Councils 6, 11, 338 N.W.2d at 576. In order to prevent decen-
tralized and discordant administration of public persons, pension contribution levels are 
not deemed a permissible subject of bargaining. Itt. 
211. For example, most would agree that anti-discrimination principles ought to be 
applied in all public employment contexts. 
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set by statute and considered prohibited bargaining subjects where 
these policies prevail. 
Statutorily defined terms of employment are appropriate in an-
other situation. Where there is no collective bargaining relation-
ship or a necessary employment term is not set by contract, 
statutorily defined terms are needed to fill the void. These fill-in 
terms may cover areas controlled by collective bargaining in other 
employment situations. 
The Minnesota Statutes presently include laws of the two sorts 
just described as well as laws falling outside these categories. 
Thus, the first task for the legislature is to reevaluate all Minnesota 
statutes bearing on public employment. Statutes which are wholly 
incompatible with collective bargaining or, for that matter, other 
laws regarding public employment should be repealed.212 Statutes 
which embody public policies more substantial than the policy 
favoring collective bargaining should be retained.213 The legisla-
ture should also retain statutes to govern terms of employment not 
covered by collective bargaining agreements.214 It is imperative 
that the legislature review all public employment statutes simulta-
neously;215 piecemeal efforts will not provide the perspective neces-
sary to achieve an equitable and rational system. 
In sorting through the Minnesota Statutes to determine which 
statutes will supersede collective bargaining, the legislature should 
focus on which matters are appropriate for resolution through col-
lective bargaining and which matters should be resolved by the 
legislature acting as the elected representative of the public. In 
selecting terms to be set by statute, the legislature should look to 
the degree of public interest in a subject, the structure of state and 
local government, the respective strengths and weaknesses of col-
lective bargaining and the political process, the types of markets in 
212. Su, ~.g., MINN. STAT. § 387.14 (1982). Pursuant to this statute, county sheriffs are 
entitled to remove deputies at will. Id. Broad, unchecked discretion of this magnitude is 
incompatible with collective bargaining principles. This discretion is also inconsistent 
with sound public policies militating against the arbitrary dismissal of public employees. 
Finally, such authority ignores employee property interest in certain government jobs. Se~ 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
213. Su, ~.g., MINN. STAT. § 197.46 (1982) (Veterans Preference Act). 
214. S~~, ~.g., id. §§ 387.31-.45 (Sheriffs Civil Service System). 
215. The task described is of such major proportions that it probably would be best 
accomplished by a legislative commission working with or without the help of an advisory 
task force. There are presently two commissions which address public employment issues, 
the Commission on Employee Relations and the Commission on the Economic Status of 
Women. 
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which bargaining occurs, and Minnesota's public policy favoring 
public sector bargaining. 
The remaining task is to mesh these proper statutory terms with 
PELRA.216 The goal is to provide a system clearly indicating 
which statutes prevail over collective bargaining and which merely 
fill in for collective bargaining. While PELRA could be amended 
to list statutes by these two categories,217 the better approach is to 
amend the other statutes to indicate their individual rankings with 
respect to collective bargaining.218 In particular, each non-
PELRA statute which is to defer to or supersede collective bar-
gaining should expressly provide that deference or preference is to 
be accorded.219 Second, PELRA should specify clearly that the 
scope of bargaining and the enforceability of contract terms220 are 
limited to the extent indicated in other statutes. This provision 
would alert parties to check for other statutes. 
This approach has two chief benefits. First, as chapter 43A at-
tests, it affords great precision in meshing collective bargaining 
and other statutes, since it entails a section-by-section reconcilia-
tion where needed.221 The process of painstakingly reviewing each 
statute would compel adequate consideration of the public policies 
at stake. Second, if the task is well performed, the result should be 
a workable system, for each statute would carry its own clear state-
ment of the accommodation to be made. Furthermore, the diffi-
culties inherent in writing a general rule in PELRA that would 
216. Two approaches taken in other public sector labor legislation clearly are inappro-
priate. These include attempts to render collective bargaining subordinate to all other 
statutes, st'(, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-D(I)(E) (1964); TENN. CODE. ANN. 
§ 49·5510 (Supp. 1983), and legislation rendering all other statutes subordinate to collec-
tive bargaining, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-278(e) (Supp. 1983-1984); WIS. STAT. 
§ 111.93(3) (1974). Neither approach acknowledges that different statutes play different 
roles in collective bargaining. Furthermore, allowing collective bargaining to supersede 
any other statute would represent a substantial and probably excessive reallocation of 
power from the legislature to the employer and the unions. St'( Blair, supra note 41, at 12. 
Doing the opposite would render too few subjects negotiable for collective bargaining to 
work. See z'd.; Rehmus, supra note 36, at 927. 
217. St'( MINN. STAT. § 179.63, subd. 4 (1982); see also MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 
150A, § 10 (West 1982). 
218. See MINN. STAT. §§ 125.12, subds. 4, 6a, 14, 43A.01-.47 (1982). 
219. For example, Minnesota Statutes section 125.12, subdivision 6a might read, "This 
section does not apply where there is a collective bargaining agreement." Id. § 125.12, 
subd.6a. 
220. The legislature should consider how to handle terms that are unenforceable due 
to conflicts with superior statutes. Possibilities include rendering the term void or sending 
the term to an arbitrator. See z'd. § 179.66, subd. 5. 
221. See notes 120-36 and accompanying text. See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 43A.01-.47 
(1982). 
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properly reflect the many relationships between PELRA and other 
statutes are obviated. 
A residuum rule should be provided for statutes which do not 
indicate their ran kings with respect to PELRA. The best option 
would be to provide that, where there is no statutory indication 
and a conflict arises,222 collective bargaining defers to the statute. 
While the concept of "conflict" is troublesome as now used in 
PELRA, it should prove serviceable in this context. The rule's im-
pact would be relatively minimal, because it would serve merely as 
a safety net for overlooked statutes. In addition, the phrase would 
be given meaning by analogy to the relationships crafted between 
PELRA and other similar statutes which indicate their rankings 
with respect to PELRA. 
The matter of state regulatory law created pursuant to retained 
statutes remains. Such regulations would bear the same relation-
ship to collective bargaining as do their enabling statutes. 
2. Render Local Legislation Superseded by PELRA 
Local legislation and rules generally should be superseded by 
PELRA,223 because local legislation should not be permitted to 
frustrate the state policy favoring collective bargaining by con-
stricting the scope of bargaining.224 In one respect, however, local 
legislation has a place comparable to state statutes. No doubt, 
there will be local employees not represented by unions, and there 
may be topics not covered by collective bargaining agreements. In 
these situations, local legislation may properly define the terms of 
employment. 
Thus, PELRA should define the scope of bargaining so that it is 
not limited by contrary local legislation or rules and should permit 
local legislation to govern in the absence of collective bargaining. 
The 1983 amendment to section 179.66, subdivision 2, which pro-
vides that local legislation that limits or restricts225 the negotiation 
of binding contracts is superseded by PELRA, approximates what 
the law should do in this area. The legislature, however, should 
clarify the law. 
222. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.28 (West Supp. 1983-1984). 
223. The options available here are the same as those that exist at the state level. Com-
pare, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-474(1) (1972) and MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 150E, 
§ 7(d) (West 1982) with MINN. STAT. § 179.66, subd. 5 (1982). 
224. See Local 1383, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. City of Warren, 411 Mich. 642, 311 
N.W.2d 702 (1981). 
225. See MINN. STAT. § 179.66, subd. 2 (1982). 
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In addition to the 1983 amendment to section 179.66, subdivi-
sion 2, PELRA should expressly address the problem of local legis-
lation as an aspect of the scope of bargaining. The provisions 
recommended above concerning state statutes should be stated 
clearly as pertaining to state statutes only. A parallel clause 
should provide that local legislation shall not operate to constrict 
the scope of bargaining. This parallel provision would not impair 
the validity of local legislation which governs terms of employment 
where there is no collective bargaining relationship or contract 
term, because such local legislation by definition does not conflict 
with collective bargaining. Finally, state statutes authorizing local 
legislation which touches on public employment relationships 
should indicate that valid collective bargaining agreements super-
sede local legislation. 
3. A Special Problem: O'vd Service Systems 
The existence of civil service systems at the state and local levels 
poses a special problem. These systems represent the former model 
and clash with the current model of collective bargaining.226 Re-
taining civil service along with collective bargaining fosters confu-
sion and disputes over their respective roles. On the other hand, to 
discard civil service entirely may prove imprudent; civil service 
generally embodies key public policies, such as the merit principle, 
and safeguards against arbitrary government action.227 The legis-
lature should carefully evaluate the continued viability of civil 
service systems and principles in reconciling collective bargaining 
and other laws.228 
226. See Comment, supra note 53, at 826, 828-29. 
227. See MINN. STAT. §§ 43A.OI-.47 (1982); see also Comment, supra note 54, at 827. 
Civil service evolved in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to deal with the 
"inefficiency, extravagance, and arbitrary dismissal of personnel following each change of 
political power." Comment, supra note 53, at 827. The subsequent establishment of the 
Civil Service Commission was an attempt to ensure that hiring decisions would be based 
solely on merit. Id. 
228. The methods of accommodating collective bargaining and civil service are funda-
mentally the same as those for other state and local laws. The law could provide that 
collective bargaining replaces civil service, although this option appears unpopular. Laws 
which replace collective bargaining with civil service, however, are fairly popular. See, 
e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 969 (1964); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:3 (1977 & 
Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.100 (Supp. 1983-1984). Middle ground positions 
call for a mix of the two, with civil service continuing to function either in areas ceded to it 
by law, su, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-D(I)(E)(2) (1964); WIS. STAT. 
§ 111.93(2), (3) (1974), or in areas left to it by the parties in their collective bargaining 
agreements. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 43A.OI-.47 (1982). For a general discussion of these 
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Certain resolutions to this problem have more merit than others. 
Civil service systems at both the state and local levels are appropri-
ate where there is no collective bargaining relationship. Even 
where collective bargaining exists, state policy may well indicate 
that certain civil service principles, such as merit selection and 
safeguards against arbitrary personnel actions,229 should prevail. 
These principles could be perpetuated through the continuation of 
civil service systems230 or transformed into legal requirements ap-
plicable to collective bargaining agreements.231 The latter course 
is preferable, for it eliminates confusion and duplication of effort. 
For the same reason, the opportunity for the parties to contract 
into the civil service system itself, by failing to negotiate a term on 
point or by incorporating the system into the contract, should be 
minimal. Still, parties should be free to incorporate civil service 
standards or principles. 
C Permisslve and Mandatory Bargaining Subjects: Balancing Interests 
Relatively few aspects of employment will be determined by 
statute under the proposed system. Terms not set by statute con-
stitute the scope of allowable bargaining subjects available to the 
parties. 
I. Mandatory and PermissIve Subjects 
The initial question which must be resolved considers whether 
allowable subjects should be divided into mandatory and permis-
sive categories. The disadvantage of this distinction is that the line 
drawn by the law tends to preempt the parties' decisions concern-
ing bargaining subjects.232 The argument in favor of retaining the 
two categories is that an employer should have the right ofunilat-
options and what other states have chosen, see Edwards, supra note 37, at 9\0-12; Com-
ment, supra note 53, at 829-30. 
229. Se-e Edwards,supra note 37, at 911 (civil service should continue to control at most 
hiring, promotions, and demotions); H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER,supra note 32, at 145 
(civil service should control only hiring of new applicants). 
230. E.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 43A.01-.47 (1982). 
231. For example, Minnesota law forbids discrimination in employment on the basis of 
certain protected classifications. Id. § 363.03, subds. 1, 7. Collective bargaining agree-
ments affronting this statute would be unenforceable. PELRA requires that all agree-
ments contain grievance and arbitration procedures covering disciplinary matters. Id. at 
§ 179.70, subd. 1. 
232. Some have argued further that for various reasons the distinction is entirely inapt 
in the public sector . .see, e.g., Edwards,supra note 37, at 909-\0; Sackman,supra note 41, at 
188-94. 
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eral control over certain matters and that recognition of permissive 
subjects allows this contro1.233 This choice is needed to give the 
employer flexibility and to make it truly accountable for its ac-
tions. To assure that the government fulfills its public trust, there 
should be core decisions which it alone has the freedom and re-
sponsibility to make, unilaterally or through collective bargaining. 
While the issue is close, the better view retains the distinction 
between permissive and mandatory subjects. The most persuasive 
reason for this distinction is to safeguard the public trust held by 
the government. Furthermore, if the line between permissive and 
mandatory bargaining subjects is properly drawn, the argument 
against the two categories loses much of its force. 
In addition, Minnesota's unique scheme of negotiations supple-
mented by meet-and-confer234 justifies drawing the distinction. 
For professional employees with meet-and-confer rights, the harsh 
consequences of the line between mandatory and permissive sub-
jects are softened, for the employer must confer over permissive 
subjects. This requirement presumably discounts the importance 
of the distinction to the parties and reduces their inclination to 
debate and litigate over it. Indeed, the legislature may wish, after 
studying meet-and-confer,235 to extend it to other employees. 
2. Drawing The Line: A Balancing of Interests Test 
While the law should continue to provide for mandatory and 
permissive subjects, much of the present law regarding the line be-
tween the two categories should be abandoned. While certain 
small changes would yield some improvement,236 these changes 
would not suffice, since the present law lacks proper focus. 
There are many ways to draw the line between permissive and 
mandatory subjects.237 The best approach is that which balances 
233. It should be noted that the concern that the employer will be forced to bargain 
about major issues of public policy can be eliminated by statutorily prohibiting the collec-
tive bargaining of certain subjects. 
234. See supra note 25. 
235. The legislature's study should include insuring the constitutionality of meet-and-
confer requirements. 
236. For example, the awkward reference to educational policies could be deleted from 
the definition of terms and conditions. The supreme court could choose one of its several 
approaches to this issue and follow that approach consistently. 
237. Typically, statutes contain language much like PELRA's and the line-drawing is 
left to the courts. In some jurisdictions, the question is not whether a subject is mandatory 
or permissive, but whether it is negotiable at all. For a general discussion of approaches 
taken in various jurisdictions, see Clark, supra note 64, at 85; Sackman, supra note 41, at 
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the interests of employees in the matter at issue against the com-
peting interests of the employer in controlling the matter. 238 
While this approach may not yield immediately apparent results 
in all cases, it has much to recommend it. 
First, balancing tests are common in the law239 and the factors 
to be considered would be easily recognized by employers, unions, 
and judges. In this respect, the balancing approach is clearly supe-
rior to the decisions/implementation/effects approach. Parties do 
168-88. The law could be guided by NLRA precedent. &e, e.g., Fire Fighters, Local 1383 
v. City of Warren, 411 Mich. 642, 311 N.W.2d 702 (1981); Fire Fighters Union v. City of 
Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 526 P.2d 971, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1974). Incorporating NLRA 
precedent is dubious, however, because the contexts of public and private labor relations 
are not sufficiently analogous. Another alternative is to focus on whether a particular 
matter is significantly, substantially, or directly related to working conditions. See, e.g., 
Beloit City School Bd. v. Wisconsin Employment ReI. Comm., 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 
231 (1976); Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of Educ., 215 N.W.2d 837 (S.D. 1974); 
Board of Educ. v. Englewood Teachers Ass'n, 64 N.]. I, 311 A.2d 729 (1973); School Dist. 
of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972). 
This approach is one-sided, however, because an argument can be made that almost any 
subject bears heavily on working conditions. See Clark, supra note 64, at 85. 
Another method, presently followed in Minnesota, is to divide a matter into constitu-
ents--the decision, how the decision is implemented, and the effects of the decision. &e 
supra notes 185-200 and accompanying text. This, with some modification, is the ap-
proach taken by the federal public labor relations law. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7103(14), 7106 
(Supp. II 1978); Department of Defense, Army - Air Force Exch. Servo V. Federal Labor 
Relations Auth., 659 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Both Minnesota law and case law under 
the federal statute demonstrate the weaknesses of this approach. Another alternative 
would be for the legislature to set forth an exhaustive list of subjects, and the court, in 
turn, to require a relation between mandatory matters and one of the listed subjects. See, 
e.g., National Educ. Ass'n-Topeka v. USD 501, Shawnee County, 225 Kan. 445, 592 P.2d 
93 (1979); Spokane Educ. Ass'n V. Barnes, 83 Wash. 2d 366, 517 P.2d 1362 (1974). Yet, 
determining an appropriate scope of bargaining by legislating an exclusive list is difficult, 
especially where the statute covers many types of employees, as PELRA does. Another 
approach to drawing the line between permissive and mandatory subjects would be to 
refer to industry custom. See, e.g., West Hartford Educ. Ass'n V. De Courcy, 162 Conn. 
566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972). Relying on industry practice is also problematic, however, be-
cause written contract terms do not always reflect the true scope of fruitful negotiations. 
&e Clark, supra note 64, at 65; Gerhart, supra note 7, at 550. The law could balance the 
interests of the employees against the interest of the public in resolving the matter politi-
cally. &e, e.g., City of Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 392 N.E.2d 1202 (Mass. 
App. 1979); City of Brookfield v. Wisconsin Employment ReI. Comm., 87 Wis. 2d 804,275 
N.W.2d 723 (1979). The appropriate use of this balancing test is to determine statutorily 
excluded subjects. 
238. &e, e.g., National Educ. Ass'n of Shawnee Mission v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 
741,512 P.2d 426 (1973); Sutherlin Educ. Ass'n V. Sutherlin School Dist., 25 Or. App. 85, 
548 P.2d 204 (1976); Pennsylvania Labor Rels. Bd. v. State College Area, 461 Pa. 494, 337 
A.2d 262 (1975). This approach has proved popular with commentators. &e Corbett, 
supra note 41, at 250-67; Summers, supra note 41, at 1192-97. 
239. &e Corbett, supra note 41, at 251. 
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not conceive of bargaining subjects as decisions, the implementa-
tion of decisions, or the effects of decisions. 
Second, a balancing approach lends itself to flexible, case-by-
case determinations.240 The present approach is a technical legal 
construct with little room for consideration of the facts of each 
case. For example, under the current approach, a decision is not a 
mandatory subject regardless of its unimportance to the employer 
or importance to the employees. A balancing approach, by con-
trast, would take these factors into consideration. 
The principal advantage of the balancing approach is that it 
openly acknowledges and focuses on the real issue:241 the compet-
ing interests of employers and employees in setting contract terms 
through collective bargaining. It affords a forum for considering 
the facts presented by each case in light of the policies underlying 
collective bargaining. Under the balancing approach, for exam-
ple, a decisionmaker would consider how the matter relates to the 
employer's need to control the running of the government, the 
contributions employees could make through bargaining over the 
subject, and to what degree the subject affects the working condi-
tions of employees. 
Current Minnesota law contains hints of a balancing of interests 
test. In developing the duty to provide information, the Operating 
Engineers decision focuses on the employees' interest in fair exami-
nations and on the employers' competing interest in confidential-
ity.242 In Minneapolis Federation, the supreme court observed the 
employees' substantial interest in being transferred,243 while in 
Minneapolis Administrators, the court was influenced by the em-
ployer's substantial interest in directing the functions of adminis-
trative employees.244 
While the shift to a balancing of interests approach could be 
initiated by either the legislature or the judiciary, the best ap-
proach is joint action.245 Th.e legislature should provide statutory 
language which calls for this analysis, and the supreme court and 
240. Clark, supra note 65, at 95. 
241. Id. at 92. 
242. 305 Minn. at 370-71, 233 N.W.2d at 753. 
243. 258 N.W.2d at 805. 
244. 311 N.W.2d at 476-77. 
245. Another approach would be to relegate the matter to an administrative agency, 
see if/fta notes 255-73 and accompanying text, and proceed through rulemaking under 
Minnesota's Administrative Procedure Act. See MINN. STAT. §§ 14.01-.70 (1982). 
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agency recommended below should complement the amendments 
by adopting the new orientation. 
3. Legislative Changes 
The legislature should create two clearly distinct categories of 
bargaining subjects and establish a balancing of interests analysis. 
While this could be done in various ways,246 a straightforward 
method is best. 
First, PELRA should contain a single section on this point. This 
section should first state that parties must bargain over employ-
ment terms, and may, but are not required to, bargain over mana-
gerial policies. This general provision should clearly indicate that 
these are mutually exclusive categories. The statute should also 
define employment terms and managerial policies, again making 
clear that they are mutually exclusive categories. For example, the 
statute could define employment terms as aspects of the employer-
employee relationship in which the legitimate interests of employ-
ees equal or outweigh the legitimate interests of the employer and 
managerial policies as aspects in which the legitimate interests of 
employees are less than those of the employer. Alternatively, the 
basic definition could be phrased in terms of the impact on em-
ployees compared to the impact on the government. Language 
indicating an allocation of evenly balanced subjects to the cate-
gory of employment terms would reflect Minnesota's presumption 
toward a liberal scope of bargaining. 
The statute should also contain a list of clearly identified illus-
trative matters for each category.247 The present PELRA defini-
tional lists are too abbreviated248 and too generaJ249 to be useful. 
Rather than provide, for example, that the "selection and direc-
246. Other possibilities include definitions which do not include illustrative lists and 
definitions which seek to define the legitimate interests of employers and employees. The 
former would likely prove too vague and the latter almost impossible to draft. See, e.g., 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1722 (1978). 
247. The list could be introduced as follows: "Employment terms include, but are not 
limited to ... " See MINN. STAT. § 179.66, subd. 1 (1982). The chief alternative is to list 
factors which suggest that either the employer's or the employees' interests are paramount. 
One could list, for example, working environment, compensation, and safety as employee 
interests. The chief difficulty is that almost any item could be argued to touch on a listed 
employee or employer interest. 
248. See, e.g., id. § 179.63, subd. 18 (definition of terms and conditions). 
249. See, e.g., id. § 179.63, subd. 18; id. § 179.66, subd. 1 (definition of managerial 
policies). 
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tion and number of personnel" are managerial policies,250 the stat-
ute should indicate that, for example, the initial hiring of 
employees is a managerial policy. There is little risk that the list 
would be too detailed, since it must reflect PELRA's comprehen-
sive scope.251 
Providing a list in addition to the basic definitions has two ad-
vantages. First, certain matters are categorized without the need 
for litigation. Second, the list provides a fertile ground for analo-
gies in construing the basic definitions.252 Analogies should yield 
more predictable results than does grappling with bare definitions. 
1. Judicial Changes 
The proposed amendments to PELRA would require the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's analysis of scope of bargaining cases to 
shift accordingly. In one respect, the present case law could be 
retained. Presumptions are useful in analyses which call for a bal-
ancing of interests, in order to resolve evenly-tipped scales. Since 
the recommendations made here are not intended to affect the de-
gree to which the law in the abstract favors collective bargaining, 
the court's presumption in favor of a liberal scope of bargaining 
would be retained.253 Indeed, the proposed wording of the basic 
definition of employment terms perpetuates that presumption. 
D. An Agency to Resolve Bargaining Disputes 
The troubled character of the present law results in part from 
lack of legislative and judicial experience in public sector labor 
relations. To insure that future disputes are resolved in the first 
instance by expert decisionmakers,254 the final recommendation of 
250. Id § 179.66, subd. 1. 
251. Cj KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5413 (1980) (teacher's contract statute providing de-
tailed definitional list). 
252. See National Educ. Ass'n v. United School Dist. No. 500, Wyandotte County, 227 
Kan. 541,608 P.2d 415 (1980). 
253. However, the rationales for the presumption in favor of a liberal scope of bargain-
ing should be abandoned. In addition, in one respect, the court's present approach, which 
distinguishes decisions, their implementation, and their effects, has produced law harmo-
nious with the recommended approach. It would be surprising if the effects of matters 
deemed managerial policies did not qualify as terms of employment under the statute. Cj 
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 449 U.S. 1076 (1983) (effects of managerial pre-
rogative are mandatory bargaining subjects). While the present effects rule should not be 
retained as such, its import no doubt would survive under the new law. 
254. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,488 (1951) (court character-
izes NLRB as "one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to 
deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the au-
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this Article is to urge the legislature to create an administrative 
agency whose charge includes resolving bargaining disputes. A 
second benefit of such an agency is that it would provide a large 
body of readily available precedent.255 While the details of the 
structure and functioning of the agency256 are beyond the scope of 
this Article, a few of the major issues merit mention. 
The major issue facing the legislature will be the range of func-
tions to be performed by the newly constituted agency. PELRA is 
presently administered by the Bureau of Mediation Services257 and 
the Public Employment Relations Board,258 neither of which ad-
dresses scope of bargaining disputes. The courts hear unfair prac-
tice cases, including those entailing scope of bargaining disputes.259 
An alternative to this diffused system is provided by the NLRA, 
which is governed by a single agency, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board260 (NLRB). Among other things, the Board runs rep-
resentation elections261 and decides unfair labor practice cases,262 
including cases alleging a failure to bargain over mandatory bar-
gaining subjects.263 The merits of the comprehensive agency 
model are evident. Since the agency administers the entire law, it 
can place issues in perspective in adjudicating individual cases re-
garding the scope of bargaining. Confusion as to the relative roles 
of several agencies and the duplication of resources required to op-
erate more than one agency are avoided.264 
thority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect."); NLRB 
v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944). 
255. The NLRB publishes its decisions, as do private publishers. Private labor law 
sources include the National Labor Rdations Board Dwsions published by Commercial Clear-
ing House, the Labor Rdations Report" published by the Bureau of National Affairs, and the 
Labor Rdations Rif"mce Manual also published by the Bureau of National Affairs. 
256. Other issues demanding careful consideration include the method of agency 
member selection and terms of office, the compilation and promulgation of agency deci-
sions, where the agency hears cases, the costs of litigation before the agency, and its litiga-
tion procedures. 
257. The Bureau of Mediation Service (BMS) is a professional labor agency which, 
among other things, conducts elections, provides mediation services, and hears fair share 
fee challenges. MINN. STAT. § 179.71 (1982). 
258. The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) is a panel of citizens whose 
. tasks include hearing fair share fee and bargaining unit appeals, determining the status of 
certain employees, and hearing "independent review" grievances. Id. §§ 179.72-.76. 
259. See id. § 179.68. 
260. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976); F. MCCULLOCK & T. BORNSTEIN, THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (1974). 
261. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976). 
262. Id. § 160. 
263. Id. §§ I 58 (a) (5), I 59 (b) (3). 
264. This raises the question of what to do with the PERB and the BMS. The PERB 
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The legislature should carefully study the method by which 
scope of bargaining disputes are prosecuted. Under PELRA, ag-
grieved persons bring and litigate unfair labor practices;265 refusal-
to-bargain cases probably are brought by employers or exclusive 
representatives. Under the NLRA, the parties bring refusal-to-
bargain complaints to the regional offices of the NLRB, which 
prosecute the unfair labor practices.266 On balance, PELRA's ap-
proach has more merit than that of the NLRA. Requiring parties 
to litigate their own disputes may deter litigation. Affording the 
resources of the government to one party may make litigation 
more attractive and arguably provides the complainant an unfair 
advantage.267 Furthermore, the NLRA approach is expensive for 
the public, in terms of both the government's money and its 
resources. 
The legislature should consider mechanisms other than unfair 
labor practice charges. Certainly, the legislature should assure 
that bargaining disputes are resolved expeditiously, either through 
an expedited unfair labor practice procedure268 or by another less 
detailed mechanism. The agency could, for example, issue advi-
sory OpInIOns. 
Finally, the legislature should carefully study the relationship 
between the agency and the courts. While there should be judicial 
review of agency decisions, this review should not afford an oppor-
tunity for significant delay or judical second-guessing of agency 
decisions. Mechanisms for avoiding these problems include a def-
erential standard of review,269 an appeal route which skips the dis-
trict court,270 the requirement that the losing appellant bear the 
respondent's costs where the appeal is frivolous,271 and making the 
as it now exists should be abolished. The BMS could continue as a separate, private sector 
agency. &e MINN. STAT. §§ 179.01·.17 (1982). Another alternative is to create one labor 
agency, an expanded BMS, with both private and public sector functions. 
265. Id. § 179.68. 
266. 29 U.S.c. § 160 (1976). 
267. On the other hand, under the NLRA, regional office attorneys gain an early op-
portunity to settle cases. Presumably, the government does not prosecute non-meritorious 
cases. 
268. &e, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 20.1-.30 (1979). 
269. &e, e.g., Patzwald v. Public Employment Rels. Bd., 306 N.W.2d 118 (Minn. 1981) 
(substantial evidence standard applied to BMS bargaining unit decision; significant defer-
ence accorded). 
270. There is little justification for skipping the new intermediate appellate court. 
There is substantial justification, however, for skipping the district court, which merely 
adds a superfluous layer without expertise in the area or an appellate perspective. 
271. &e, e.g., Heck's, Inc., 215 NLRB 765 (1974). 
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agency's order effective pending appea1. 272 
V. CONCLUSION 
Defining the scope of bargaining under PELRA has become an 
increasingly difficult and confusing task. The provisions of 
PELRA and the Minnesota Supreme Court decisions which inter-
pret those provisions are inconsistent and ambiguous. The myriad 
of state and local laws coexisting with PELRA further complicates 
the task. The present mechanism for resolving the inevitable dis-
putes that arise is inefficient and lacks the reliable precedent neces-
sary to guide both judges and parties. This Article suggests that 
the law can be improved by refining which subjects are prohibited 
by statute; by focusing on the interests of the parties in determin-
ing which subjects are mandatory and which are permissive; and 
by instituting an effective means of resolving disputes. Neverthe-
less, the legal system's responsibility to those it governs entails a 
frank recognition of the law's limits. 
The negotiating parties, in the public interest, should consider 
concessions which would facilitate the task of the other in car-
rying out its statutory functions where the benefit to one is clear 
and there is no corresponding detriment to the other. That is 
the way responsible people who are in good faith act when 
there is a public interest in their endeavors.273 
272. S.u, e.g., N.]. REV. STAT. § 34: 13A-5.2 (1974). 
273. National Educ. Ass'n v. Unified School Dist. No. 500, 227 Kan. 541, 545, 608 
P.2d 415, 417 (1980). 
